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Law on detention is not settled, and policy on detention and detainee
treatment is still a matter of active wrangling between the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. 1 Political leaders and the public face a
situation aptly described as a “mess” of detentions:2 166 remaining detainees at
1. In the last legislative year before this Article was published, Congress again reformed
the law governing detention in armed conflicts. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 1021–1024, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562–66 (2011) (to be codified at
10 U.S.C. § 801 note). On September 12, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York issued a permanent injunction against enforcement of one of the law’s provisions,
Section 1021(b)(2), which expanded the scope of activities and persons potentially subject to
indefinite detention for activities understood to be opposed to the U.S. government in its war
against al Qaeda and affiliates. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at
*45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012), injunction stayed by Nos. 12-3176 (L), 12-3644 (Con.), 2012 WL
4075626 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2012) (staying the injunction only two days after the district court
granted it). Litigation on the matter continues.
During the drafting process, several provisions of the 2012 Defense Authorization bill
related to procedures for handling detainees had already met with administration objections. See,
e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1036
(2011) (substituting a new system of review for the system established by Exec. Order No.
13,567, 3 C.F.R. 227 (2011)); id. § 1039 (preventing the Executive from transferring detainees to
the United States for trial, imprisonment, or release if exonerated); id. § 1040 (restricting transfers
of detainees to foreign countries). The White House officially registered its objections and
threatened a veto if those provisions were included in the final bill. OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R.
1540 – NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2012, at 2–3 (2011) (“If the final bill
presented to the President includes these provisions that challenge critical Executive branch
authority, the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto.”). Congress removed some
provisions, including sections 1036 and 1039, and amended others. The President signed the final
bill to approve defense appropriations, but simultaneously issued a signing statement expressing
the administration’s “serious reservations” to some remaining provisions regarding detainee
treatment. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
DOC.
978
(Dec.
31,
2011),
available
at
2011
DAILY COMP. PRES.
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100978/pdf/DCPD-201100978.pdf (explaining that the
President signed the bill in order to appropriate funds for military operations “despite having
serious reservations with certain provisions that regulate the detention, interrogation, and
prosecution of suspected terrorists”). The administration subsequently reasserted executive
authority to try terrorism suspects in Article III courts (i.e., to waive the transfer of suspected
terrorists to military custody that the bill sought to require). See Directive on Procedures
Implementing Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
Presidential Policy Directive 14, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 14 (Feb. 28, 2012) [hereinafter
Presidential Policy Directive], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-20120013
6/pdf/DCPD-201200136.pdf.
On a parallel track, states party to the Geneva Conventions have concluded their quadrennial
review, which included international law regarding detention on its agenda, keeping the issue of
detention in play in interstate diplomacy as well. See Int’l Committee of the Red Cross,
Strengthening Legal Protections for Victims of Armed Conflicts Report, 31IC/11/5.1.1 (Oct.
2011).
2. Referring to the Guantanamo Bay facility, the 240 detainees interned therein when his
administration took office, and the policies and practices that had produced them, President
Barack Obama described the situation, stating: “We’re cleaning up something that is, quite
simply, a mess—a misguided experiment . . . .” Remarks at the National Archives and Records
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the Guantanamo Bay facilities, 3 3,200 more detainees at facilities in
Afghanistan, 4 and a jumbled legacy of practice 5 and precedent 6 that itself
remains to be sorted through. This Article is one of a series of projects
motivated by concern over effective advocacy by a U.S. legal community
confronting extensions of executive power after 9/11.7 The aim of this Article
is to reflect on these recent experiences with practices of detention and to
propose changes to lawyerly strategy, national security policy, and
international law in regard to detention and detainees with an eye toward future
conduct.
Our conceptual vocabulary has not kept pace with experience. Although
legal experts, the press, and the public rely on one generic term, “detention,”
Administration, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 388 (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter National
Archives Speech], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900388/pdf/DCPD
-200900388.pdf.
HERALD,
Nov.
27,
2007,
3. By
the
Numbers,
MIAMI
http://www.miamiherald.com/2007/11/27/322461/by-the-numbers.html (last updated Dec. 24,
2012).
4. Detainees in Afghanistan were scattered among different facilities until U.S. forces
consolidated theater detention operations at Bagram Air Force Base in Parwan province,
Afghanistan. Matthew C. Waxman, The Law of Armed Conflict and Detention Operations in
Afghanistan, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 343, 344 (2009). The facility, formerly called the Bagram
Collection Point, was known as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF) until its nearby
successor, the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), was constructed. As of March 2012, the
United States reportedly held 3,200 detainees in Afghanistan. Rod Nordland, U.S. and
Afghanistan Agree on Prisoner Transfer as Part of Long-term Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2012, at A9. Currently, the planned transfer of the Parwan facility from U.S./ISAF to Afghan
government control has been cast into doubt. See infra notes 48–56 (describing the transfer
process and the glitch).
5. The legacy includes detainees, detention facilities, and detention practices in Iraq no
longer under U.S. control that, while they were under U.S. government control, affected hundreds
of Iraqi civilians as well as combatants. During the period when those facilities were under U.S.
control, U.S. military, intelligence operatives, or contractors were found responsible in at least
seventy-one cases of detainee abuse, including at least six deaths of Iraqis in U.S. custody. A.T.
CHURCH, III, DEP’T. OF DEF., REVIEW OF DETENTION OPERATIONS AND INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES 12 (2005) [hereinafter THE CHURCH REPORT], officially redacted and released
excerpts available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/Church
_Report_pp235and242.pdf. An unauthorized document purporting to be the unredacted Church
Report is available at http://www.aclu.org/images/torture/asset_upload_file625_26068.pdf. The
report is so-called after Naval Inspector General, Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, III, who headed
the team that investigated and reported on U.S. interrogation practices in the global “war on
terror” at the behest of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, after photos of detainee abuse at the Abu
Ghraib detention facility in Iraq became public.
6. “Legacy of precedent” refers not only to judicial precedent, which is significant in its
own right, see infra Part II, but also to the jumble of policy justifications, ad hoc
decision-making, extensions of executive power, bureaucracies and institutions, and the imprint
on bodies and lives interned at U.S. government installations that the Obama administration
inherited when it took office in January 2009.
7. See, e.g., Monica Eppinger, Military Tribunals: A Critical Assessment, 56 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1153 (2012).
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the U.S. executive branch has actually practiced at least three different modes
of detention in the “war on terror”: criminal detention, national security
detention for the purpose of prevention (preventive detention), and national
security detention for the purpose of interrogation (interrogative detention).
Reliance on an overgeneralized term glosses over important distinctions with
serious practical effects. When the general term “detention” in current usage is
taken to mean only “criminal detention,” it reflects a misunderstanding of what
national security experts are actually working on. Framing the issue so
narrowly leads to limited effectiveness in persuasion or diagnosis, insofar as it
fails to take into account some of the organizational and ethical features of the
domain of national security or results in misrecognition of some kinds of
executive branch conduct. Reconceiving detention based on observation of its
actual practice should yield clarity and specificity that will serve future
advocacy efforts.
This Article has several goals. The first is to survey the modes in which the
U.S. executive branch has practiced detention against non-state actors since
9/11. A second goal is to address part of that gap between legal practitioners
and national security practitioners, particularly as it concerns detention in the
“war on terror.” This Article builds on the work of other scholars and
advocates who have directed attention to preventive or interrogative detention8
and is meant to augment work on the criminal paradigm.9
This gap, apparent among domestic practitioners, is less pronounced in
international law. The international legal community has long made legal
provision for preventive detention during combat under customary
international law aimed at rendering fighters hors de combat.10 However, even
the international legal community, perhaps for tactical reasons, has declined to
modify the international law that regulates interrogative detention.11 Thus, a
third goal of this Article is to put forth some proposals for innovation in the
8. See, e.g., Tyler Davidson & Kathleen Gibson, Experts Meeting on Security Detention
Report: International Committee of the Red Cross & the Frederick K. Cox International Law
Center, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 323, 372–73 (2009) (summarizing presentations made at a
meeting of experts convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Frederick
K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Reserve University devoted to legal and
practical issues associated with “security detention”); John P. McLoughlin et al., Security
Detention, Terrorism, and the Prevention Imperative, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 463, 492–503
(2009) (outlining likely characteristics of, and questions associated with, a new U.S. “security
detention process”); see also Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the
Complementarity Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law–Demonstrated by
the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 437, 438–39 (2009).
9. See generally Eric M. Freedman, Who’s Afraid of the Criminal Law Paradigm in the
“War on Terror?”, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 323 (2007).
10. See infra Part II.C (providing additional description).
11. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross & Red Crescent [ICRC], Background Document for the
31st International Conference of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 5–6 (2011),
[hereinafter ICRC Background Document].
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international law of war. These proposals are based on observation of state
practice in regard to detention in an attempt to incorporate the diverse national
security motivations that currently drive detention policy.
Part I of this Article reviews detention as practiced by the U.S. executive
branch in the “war on terror.” This review provides ground to propose an
expanded conceptualization of detention. Part II examines the legal contours
of the present context, reporting the source of law by which the executive
justifies its practices of detention in the “war on terror.” Part II also outlines
the definitional distinctions that international law currently provides between
international and non-international armed conflict and the consequences of
those classifications. Part III proposes a framework for understanding the
conceptual contours of detention and suggests that lawyers and human rights
advocates turn greater attention to the two other forms of detention practiced
by the executive branch in addition to that with which advocates are more
familiar—criminal detention. Part IV calls for release of detainees held in
preventive detention at the cessation of hostilities and makes proposals, based
on recent experience, regarding tribunals in all three forms of detention
outlined herein.
I. THE STATUS QUO: WHY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT ENOUGH
A. Detention in Practice
1. Guantanamo: From Rasul to Stall
The vast majority of legal efforts on behalf of detainees held in the “war on
terror” have concentrated on detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 12 U.S.
civilian and military attorneys strove to force the executive branch to accord
Guantanamo detainees due process. This entailed disputing whether any
process was due and then building procedure from the ground up. Attorneys
sought first to secure federal jurisdiction for detainees at Guantanamo13 and to
file habeas corpus petitions for them. 14 Once the executive announced
12. See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 4, at 343 (discussing the relative neglect by the U.S. legal
community of commission trials or processing procedures for Bagram detainees). But see THE
OPEN SOC’Y INST. & THE LIAISON OFFICE, STRANGERS AT THE DOOR: NIGHT RAIDS BY
INTERNATIONAL FORCES LOSE HEARTS AND MINDS OF AFGHANS (2010) [hereinafter
STRANGERS AT THE DOOR], available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites
/default/files/a-afghan-night-raids-20100222_0.pdf (for rights-advocates’ study of U.S. and ISAF
detention-related night raids in Afghanistan).
13. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, authorizes U.S. federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction over foreign nationals held at the U.S.
Navy facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795
(2008) (holding that petitioners, Guantanamo detainees, had a constitutional right to habeas
review).
14. See generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 33180, ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT
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formation of a military commission to try some detainees, attorneys filed
actions seeking to address serious shortcomings with due process in the
commission. 15 The actions do not affect detainees who are not American
citizens; the executive branch transferred American-citizen detainees to U.S.
military detention facilities in the United States, and attorneys there promptly
filed habeas petitions on their behalf.16 As a general matter, those representing
detainees and others trying to influence U.S. government treatment of “war on
terror” detainees focused their efforts on securing detainees a fair trial.17
When the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that U.S. civilian courts have
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions from alien detainees held by the
U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay,18 criminal procedure seemed vindicated as a
mode of ensuring humane treatment and fair review for detainees. Certainly,
the Court’s holding regarding federal jurisdiction together with subsequent
cases regarding detainee rights to trial19 prompted institutional innovation by
the executive branch holding detainees and accelerated the institution of
military commissions. In retrospect, however, it is clear that the habeas route
did not fulfill all the hopes of detainees and their advocates.20
The scope of that failed promise is significant. For most detainees over the
last ten years, detention has been the product of decisions made outside of the
Military Commission system.21 Since 2002, 779 detainees have been held at
Guantanamo.22 Under both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations,
the Military Commission has only dealt with sixteen Guantanamo detainees,

(2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33180_20100405.pdf. For a sample of
habeas petitions filed, see, for example, Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Bacha
v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2009); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C.
2009); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2009); Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp.
2d 240 (D.D.C. 2009); El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Alwi v. Bush,
593 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2008); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008); Al Bihani v.
Bush, 588 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2008); Al Ginco v. Bush, 588 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2008);
Al-Adahi v. Bush, 585 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2008); and Khadar v. Bush, No. 04-1136 (JDB),
2006 WL 2666144 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2006), superseded sub nom. Hicks v. Bush, 452 F. Supp. 2d
88 (D.D.C. 2006).
15. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Note that Hamdan is exceptional in that
Hamdan’s lawyers petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus and for a writ of mandamus on his
behalf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004).
16. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 511 (2004); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386,
390 (4th Cir. 2005).
17. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., ELSEA & GARCIA, supra
note 14.
18. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481–84 (2004).
19. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557.
20. See ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 14, at 2.
21. See Eppinger, supra note 7 (describing how most decisions regarding detention have
happened outside of military commissions).
22. The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/ (last
updated Dec. 11, 2012).
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convicting seven, charging six, and sentencing three who plead guilty. 23
Obama administration review panels have designated thirty-six more detainees
eligible for trial by the Military Commission.24 To date, of a total number of
779 Guantanamo detainees, 763 have not faced a Military Commission, and of
those, 727 never will.25 Procedures other than trial have decided the fates of
many, such as the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which
reviewed the cases of 581 Guantanamo detainees during the Bush
administration (commencing July 30, 2004 and ceasing February, 10, 2009,
within three weeks of President Obama’s inauguration). 26 The CSRTs
designated 578 of these cases “Civilian Authority Final Action,” determining
that 539 detainees had been properly classified as enemy combatants and that
thirty-nine detainees—no longer classified as such—should be transferred
from Guantanamo and thus out of the jurisdiction of the Military
Commission. 27 Under the Obama administration, no detainees have been
added to the population at Guantanamo. Twenty-one detainees have been
ordered released by the courts,28 and the Military Commission will have dealt
with approximately forty-nine detainees of a known Guantanamo detainee
population of 779.29
The limited reach of formal trial procedures to affect detention at
Guantanamo is also reflected in the numbers of tribunals, besides formally
constituted military commissions, that have determined initial detention
or reviewed detainees’ continued detention. 30 The Bush administration
established the CSRTs31 in response to the Supreme Court’s rebuke in Rasul
23. Id. Only three of these convictions occurred during the Bush administration. Id. The
other thirteen are included in the thirty-six detainees identified by the Obama administration’s
tribunals. Id.
24. By the Numbers, supra note 3.
25. Id.; The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 22.
26. Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary, OFF. ADMIN. REV. DETENTION ENEMY
COMBATANTS, http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf (last updated Feb. 10, 2009).
27. Id.; ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 14, at 7–9 (noting that detainees not found to be an
enemy combatant by a CSRT are either to be transferred to their country of citizenship or dealt
with in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, and thus are no longer under the jurisdiction
of military commissions). The remaining three cases were the result of a temporary suspension of
the Administrative Reviews for Guantanamo detainees. Combatant Status Review Tribunal
Summary, supra note 26.
28. See National Archives Speech, supra note 2.
29. By the Numbers, supra note 3 (reporting that, at a maximum, totaling the number of
detainees already convicted, those facing trial, and those eligible for trial, the commissions will
have only heard forty-nine cases out of 779); see also The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 22.
30. See, e.g., ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 14, at 7–9, 47 (referencing a sample of
additional tribunals that have the authority to make initial detention decisions or to oversee
reviews for continued detention); Eppinger, supra note 7 (describing a range of informal tribunals
as formal bodies tasked to make detention decisions).
31. Combatant Status Review Tribunals, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf.
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and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld of the administration’s procedures for designating a
detainee an “enemy combatant.” 32 When President Obama took office, his
administration created a task force to review the case of each Guantanamo
detainee to assess the possibility of change, transfer, or release.33 The Obama
administration subsequently created Periodic Review Boards (PRBs) to
conduct regular review of the justification for continued detention of each
Guantanamo detainee.34 These justifications are primarily based on national
security considerations, not legal factors.
2. Parwan
The detainee counts of Guantanamo do not include the 3,200-plus detainees
that have been held in Afghanistan, none of whom have faced a formally
constituted military commission or other court. The United States and its
allied forces hold detainees at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) or at
field detention sites.35 The population of the field detention sites, like their
number and location, is not a matter of public record36 and, in precise terms,
may not even be known to U.S. authorities with command responsibility in
Afghanistan on a daily basis.37 From publicly available information, it appears
that most detainees in Afghanistan have been held at the DFIP (or its
predecessor, the Bagram Theater Internment Facility).38
None of the Afghanistan detainees have had formal hearings before a
military commission, although other forms of tribunals have been introduced.
Beginning in October 2001, when the United Statesand its allies commenced
32. Id.; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
33. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 3 C.F.R. 207 (2009); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law
(March
25,
2010),
transcript
available
at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. As the preceding recitation shows, most
detainees continued in detention without change, transfer, or release.
34. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. 277 (2011) (Periodic Review of Individuals Detained
at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force).
35. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DETAINED AND DENIED IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW TO MAKE U.S.
DETENTION COMPLY WITH THE LAW 7–8 (2011).
36. Dep’t of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Navy Vice Admiral Robert Harward,
Commander, Joint Task Force 435, via Teleconference (Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Dep’t of Def.
Roundtable],
available
at
http://defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog_assets/20100127_Harward
_transcript.pdf.
37. Id.
38. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 2012: THE STATES OF
THE
WORLD’S
HUMAN
RIGHTS
56,
357
(2012),
available
at
http://files.amnesty.org/air12/air_2012_full_en.pdf; Muhammad Lila, U.S. to Hand over Afghan
Prisons, Including Jail Where Korans Were Burned, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9,
2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/international/us-hand-afghan-prisons-including-koran-burning
-prison/?id=15884015; Andy Worthington, Bagram: The First Ever Prisoner List (The Annotated
Version), ANDY WORTHINGTON, www.andyworthington.co.uk/bagram-the-first-ever-prisoner-l
ist-the-annotated-version/ (last updated Apr. 3, 2011).
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military action in Afghanistan, military screening teams were tasked with
locating people who were possible sources of intelligence and taking them into
custody. 39 Detention was part of the intelligence-gathering strategy in
Afghanistan from the beginning of combat operations and may even have
eclipsed combat operation at times. U.S. military teams conducted night raids
and sweeps, 40 screening teams combed Northern Alliance prisons, 41 and
roadblocks filtered mobile populations.42
Although intelligence was a primary goal, the vast majority and diverse
sources of those in U.S. custody from the beginning of combat operations in
Afghanistan meant that, initially and at many points during the conflict, U.S.
authorities did not know who they held.43 One Bush administration official
recalls,
Before we went in to Afghanistan [in September 2001], we expected
to find Saudis plus a few Yemenis and Afghans [making up al Qaeda
forces and camps]. That quickly turned out to be much more
complicated. By the end, we had detainees representing 44 different
countries. That’s why this turned into a “Global War on Terror.”
Not necessarily because they were militarily active all over the
world, but because they were recruiting all over the world. That
shows you what we were up against.44
In this mélange and other complicated scenarios, the U.S. executive branch
created groups tasked to process detainees encountered in criminal

39. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (E.D. Va. 2002) (discussing the Mobbs
Declaration and the military screening of Yaser Hamdi); see also JONATHAN MAHLER, THE
CHALLENGE: HOW A MAVERICK NAVY OFFICER AND A YOUNG LAW PROFESSOR RISKED THEIR
CAREERS TO DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION—AND WON 10–11, 93–94 (2009). For a more vivid
and chaotic description of in-theater screening in the midst of combat operations among a civilian
population, see, for example, The Church Report, supra note 5, at 14.
40. See generally STRANGERS AT THE DOOR, supra note 12.
41. MAHLER, supra note 39, at 93–94 (describing the work of U.S. military screening teams
who selected detainees from among those offered by Northern Alliance field commanders, prison
operators, and bounty hunters).
42. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (describing how Yasser Hamdi was
apprehended at a road block by local forces and turned over to the U.S. military).
43. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at Joint App. 148–50, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), available at 2004 WL 1120871, at *148–50 ("Declaration of
Michael Mobbs"); Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and
108
COLUM.
L.
REV.
1365,
Detention
of
Suspected
Terrorists,
1369–70 (2008).
44. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Pierre-Richard Prosper, former
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 22, 2011).
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investigations, combat operations, and intelligence work. 45 In Afghanistan,
detainees were sorted in the field and at detention facilities.46
The facility in Parwan where most detainees are consolidated, the DFIP, is
distinct enough in the situation of detainees, its management by U.S.
authorities, and the legal issues it raises, that it deserves a brief, separate
discussion. The DFIP was established to replace the hastily reconfigured
Bagram detention facility that was poorly equipped to handle the number of
detainees it received and that had developed a reputation for poor conditions
and, in some respects, detainee abuse. 47 Given the schedule of announced
timetables for the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan, practically from its
inception, the DFIP was intended for transfer to Afghan government
authority.48
On March 9, 2012, the governments of the United States and Afghanistan
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)49 to transfer management of
the DFIP “as soon as the Afghans appoint a commander of detention
operations.”50 On March 28, 2012, that condition was satisfied when President
Hamid Karzai named Major General Faroq Barekzai as the Afghan
commander. 51 Notably, the MOU distinguishes management of the facility
from custody of detainees, however, and specifies that the United States would
transfer management of the facility as soon as the Afghan government
appointed a commander of detention operations.52 The MOU further specified
that the United States would at that time “transfer Afghan nationals detained
45. RICHARD J. HUGHBANK & JENNIFER L. CURRY, THE DETAINEE PERSONAL
IDENTIFICATION DATA COLLECTION PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN (2002).
46. See generally INT’L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES:
DETENTION OF NON-ISAF PERSONNEL, SOP 362 (4th ed. 2006), available at
http://info.publicintelligence.net/ISAF-DetaineeSOP.pdf (outlining detention procedures for
enemy combatants).
47. See, e.g., Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A1, A12; U.S. Abused Detainees, Afghan Commission Claims,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 8, 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/01/08/afghanistan
-detainee-abuse-bagram.html.
48. Richard Leiby, U.S. Transfers Control of Military Prison to Afghan Officials, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 2012, at A10.
49. Memorandum of Understanding, Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan
Territory to Afghanistan, U.S.–Afg., Mar. 9, 2012 [hereinafter MOU], available at
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/20120408_01_memo.pdf.
General John R. Allen, ISAF
Commander of both the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, represented the United States
and Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak represented Afghanistan. Id.
50. News Release, Int’l Sec. Assistance Force, U.S., Afghanistan Agree to Turnover Parwan
Detention Facility (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/u.s
.-afghanistan-agree-to-turnover-of-parwan-detention-facility.html.
51. News Release, Int’l Sec. Assistance Force, USF-A Commander, U.S. Ambassador
Congratulate New Parwan Facility Commander (Apr. 1, 2012), available at http://www.isaf.nato
.int/article/news/usf-a-commander-u.s.-ambassador-congratulate-new-parwan-facility-commander
.html.
52. MOU, supra note 49, at para. 6(a).
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by U.S. forces at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) to Afghanistan”53
but would retain “responsibility for the detainees held by . . . DFIP under the
Law of Armed Conflict during the processing and transfer period, which is not
to last more than six months.”54 Although the six-month period has expired,
transfer of management of the DFIP has stumbled.
In any case, U.S. personnel will likely continue to play a decisive role in the
fate of detainees whom it took into custody. The United States agreed to
“continue its presence at the DFIP in order to provide advisory, technical and
logistical support for a period of one year.”55 Afghanistan agreed to “consult
with the United States before the release, including release prior to indictment,
of the transferred detainees, and, if the United States provides its assessment
that continued detention is necessary to prevent the detainee from engaging in
or facilitating terrorist activity, Afghanistan is to consider favorably such
assessment.” 56 In short, although there are non-judicial bodies making
decisions about U.S. detainees in Afghanistan, none of the thousands of
detainees held there are bound for trial before a formally constituted tribunal.
Very few were apparently held for the purpose of criminal detention. The
outcomes for those initially apprehended by U.S. forces for U.S. national
security purposes—prevention or interrogation—becomes even more unclear
as the major detention facility switches to Afghan control.
B. Grounds for Re-Conceptualizing Detention
The foregoing should inform advocates’ agenda in that it demonstrates how
limited criminal detention has been in the context of hostilities against a
non-state foe. It attests to the inadequacy of a narrow focus on gaining access
to civilian court, court martial, or a procedurally fair military
commission—efforts that help only a fraction of all detainees and address only
part of the executive branch bureaucracy that performs a sorting function.
Advocates with a narrow agenda based on a criminal detention paradigm do a
disservice to the majority of detainees excluded from the very framing of the
problem.
If detainees are not bound for trial, what is the point of holding them? The
U.S. executive branch has engaged in different modes of detention in the
current conflict, conducting detention for varying purposes. One, “criminal
detention,” refers to detention of someone who authorities suspect may have
already committed a hostile act.57 Authorities hold the detainee to conduct an
investigation, intending to bring a suspect to trial. Another mode of detention,
53. Id. at para. 4 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at para. 6(c).
55. Id. at para. 6(e).
56. Id. at para. 9.
57. Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2008) (explaining that criminal
punishment aims to condemn, punish, and/or provide retribution for past conduct).
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practiced within a national security paradigm, may be for the purpose of
preventing some future act from occurring: stopping a combatant from
returning to the battlefield, a suspected accomplice from aiding terrorists, or a
suspected terrorist from committing a hostile act. This is detention practiced as
a mode of prevention.58 Another purpose of detention may be questioning a
possible informant and gathering information. This is detention practiced in a
mode of interrogation.
Historically, criminal detention and national security detention have
intersected when persons held in preventive detention have been subject to trial
for crimes against the laws of war or for violations of martial law, often after
hostilities have ceased.59 Otherwise, the role of trial in wartime detention is
limited. Detainee rights advocates, however, have at times used the concepts
and language of criminal detention to critique the executive branch’s other
practices of detention.60
A narrow conceptualization of detention has significant consequences.
Thinking of all detention as criminal detention collapses different modes of
detention, conducted for different purposes, into one category. That, in turn,
superimposes the motivations that regulate criminal detention—i.e., the search
for truth in assessing guilt or innocence at trial—and the criminal procedures
that have evolved in answer to those motivations onto other modes for which
they are ill-suited. U.S. police forces do not torture suspects in custody
because of professional ethics as well as legal constraints;61 but those ethics
have arisen, in part, out of the knowledge that obtaining information that
cannot be introduced at trial defeats the purpose of holding a suspect in

58. See, e.g., Stephanie Cooper Blum, Preventative Detention in the War on Terror: A
Comparison of How the United States, Britain, and Israel Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist
Suspects, HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, Oct. 2008, at 1, 3 (explaining that the purpose of
preventive detention is to incapacitate a suspect when criminal charges are not feasible).
59. See, e.g., TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INT’L MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 – 1 OCTOBER 1946, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp; INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR
EAST (1948), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/index.html. But see Ex
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (regarding a military commission that operated while hostilities
were ongoing).
60. See, e.g., STRANGERS AT THE DOOR, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing that night raids
compound due process problems).
61. The law of evidence holds that information gained through involuntary confession is not
admissible as evidence at trial. The so-called “exclusionary rule” is grounded in the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, though not explicitly stated in either. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V; see
also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding that self-incriminating testimony
compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment is inadmissible); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that involuntary confessions are inadmissible as evidence in federal
court); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (adopting the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” doctrine); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule
is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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criminal detention in the first place.62 There is no reward for a police force
that repeatedly loses cases because evidence was obtained in ways that render
it inadmissible in court. The exclusionary rule keeps institutional incentives
aligned.63
By contrast, an intelligence officer tasked with obtaining actionable
intelligence or a combat soldier tasked with thwarting an attack by an
adversary may initiate detention without ever intending to take a detainee to
trial. For those practicing forms of detention outside of the criminal paradigm,
due process protections are institutionally meaningless. Extending the norms
and practices of U.S. criminal procedures designed to ensure fair trials is
ineffectual at aligning institutional incentives to ensure humane treatment or
prompt review of detainees in the context of interrogative or preventive
detention.64
II. LEGAL CONTOURS OF DETENTION IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT
A. Domestic U.S. Law
The executive branch normally conducts criminal detention within the
parameters of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.65 The executive branch
bases its claims of legal authority for depriving persons of liberty in connection
with its pursuit of the war against al Qaeda and affiliates on the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in the days
following the 9/11 attacks.66 On the basis of the AUMF, President Bush issued
a Military Order on November 13, 2001, authorizing indefinite detention of
62. See Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 342, 357 (1967) (“Unlike many deterrent mechanisms the exclusionary rule does not
achieve its effect by the infliction of sanctions, but rather by the removal of incentives.” (footnote
omitted)).
63. See id. (discussing how “the [exclusionary] rule encourages police to refrain from
unreasonable searches not for fear of punishment, but simply because there is no reason for
making them” (footnotes omitted)).
64. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, IF-ASKED GUIDANCE: KEY POINTS ON DETAINEE
TREATMENT 3 [hereinafter IF-ASKED GUIDANCE], available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi
/operation_and_plans/Detainee/10-F-0841-KeyPoints_onDetaineeTreatment.pdf (“There is broad
authority under the laws and customs of war to detain enemy combatants, without any
requirement to bring criminal charges while hostilities last. Criminal law provisions, whether in
the U.S. or elsewhere, simply are not relevant here.”); see also infra Part III.A (providing a
discussion of detention modeled on U.S. criminal procedure).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring that no person may “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
66. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) (granting the President authority “to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001”).
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anyone the President had “reason to believe . . . was a member of . . . al Qaida;
ha[d] engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism” against the United States, or had harbored any of the
same.67 The substance of that order has survived challenge, although the fate
of Congress’s latest attempt to expand the scope of the executive’s detention
authority, subject to pending challenge in the courts, is as yet unknown.68
B. Detention During International Armed Conflict: The POW Model
The law of war, or international humanitarian law, recognizes two kinds of
conflicts: international armed conflicts, meaning conflicts between states,69 and
non-international armed conflicts, meaning conflicts between a state and a
non-state actor or between non-state actors.70 The hostilities conducted under
the “war on terror” have encompassed both conflicts. 71 International law
67. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918, 919 (2002).
68. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1021(b), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note) (expanding the
scope of activities and persons potentially subject to indefinite detention for activities opposed to
the U.S. government in its war against al Qaeda and its affiliates). This attempt to expand the
scope of the executive branch’s detention authority beyond the basis provided by the AUMF has
been successfully challenged as this Article goes to press, but the injunction granted by the
Southern District of New York has since been stayed by the Second Circuit. See Hedges v.
Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012), injunction
stayed by Nos. 12-3176 (L), 12-3644(Con.), 2012 WL 4075626 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2012); see also
supra note 1.
69. Pursuant to Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the legal category of
“international armed conflict” applies “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more [states party to the Geneva Conventions] even if the state
of war is not recognized by one of them.” Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136–68 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; see also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross
[ICRC], Opinion Paper, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International
Humanitarian
Law?,
at
1
(Mar.
2008),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (describing one type
of armed conflict under international humanitarian law as “international armed conflicts,
opposing two or more States”).
70. See Common Article 3, First Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (defining
non-international armed conflicts); Second Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (same);
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (same); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note
69, at art. 3 (same); see also infra note 92. Common Article 3 is so named because it appears in
all four Geneva Conventions. For an expert opinion on what is considered “armed conflict” of
any sort under international law of war, see ICRC, supra note 69, at 3–5.
71. See, e.g., U.N. G.A. Rep. of the Human Rights Council, May 28, 2010, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Addendum, Study on
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would characterize the United States’ war against Iraq (March 2003 to
December 2011) as an “international armed conflict,” in that U.S. government
forces fought against Iraqi government forces.72 International legal consensus
is that, in Afghanistan, the United States and its NATO allies have been
engaged in “non-international armed conflict.”73 Consensus breaks regarding
hostilities in which the United States is engaged elsewhere in the name of
combatting al Qaeda, with the U.S. government arguing that non-international
armed conflict can transcend borders.74 Other governments and legal experts,
however, reject the notion that non-international armed conflict, such as the
one in Afghanistan, can legally transcend borders. They consider hostilities
outside the boundaries of Afghanistan to be beyond the scope of that conflict,
thus outside any category of hostilities permitted or regulated by the
international law of war.75
These categorizations set the legal parameters for detention. In an
international armed conflict, a member of an adversary force who surrenders or
is captured is classified as a prisoner of war (POW)76 and may be subject to
Targeted Killings, ¶¶ 50–54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010), available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf
(distinguishing international armed conflicts from non-international armed conflicts and applying
the principles of each to the isolated conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the wider
conflicts with the Taliban and al Qaeda); Diane Webber, Preventive Detention in the Law of
Armed Conflict: Throwing Away the Key?, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 167, 176 (2012)
(characterizing the initial phases of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts as international armed
conflicts, which transitioned out of this classification).
72. See, e.g., ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary
Armed Conflicts, at 10, 31IC/11/5.1.2 (Oct. 2011).
73. For representative views of the international community, see id. at 10–11. The war in
Afghanistan can be defined as “multinational armed forces . . . fighting alongside the armed
forces of a ‘host’ state—in its territory—against one or more organized armed groups.” Id.
Therefore, it does not involve two or more opposing states and “must be classified as
non-international.” Id. For the Supreme Court’s reflection on the categorization of the
Afghanistan hostilities, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–30 (2006) (leaving
unresolved whether hostilities against al Qaeda members in Afghanistan are international in
character, because Common Article 3 applies to signatories of the Geneva Convention when the
conflict is “occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” even when the
conflict is “‘not of an international character.’” (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41
(2005))).
74. The United States claims that it is involved in a non-international armed conflict with al
Qaeda that transcends the borders of Afghanistan. See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
But see ICRC, supra note 72, at 10–11 (rejecting the claim “that a conflict of global dimensions is
or has been taking place”).
75. ICRC, supra note 72, at 22 (“Pursuant to other views, which the ICRC shares, the notion
that a person ‘carries’ a NIAC [non-international armed conflict] with him to the territory of a
non-belligerent state should not be accepted.”).
76. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 4 (describing POWs as individuals
“belonging to a party to the conflict” and “who have fallen into the power of the enemy”).
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internment in a closed-perimeter camp facility.77 POW camps are governed by
the minimum standard guarantees of Common Article III of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which prohibits inhumane or degrading treatment of
prisoners captured in war. 78 Like other states party to the Third Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the United States
has bound itself to meet certain conditions of food, medical services, clothing,
and sanitation at facilities in which it interns POWs.79 Further, with particular
relevance to interrogative detention, the Third Geneva Convention permits a
Detaining Party to question POWs but prohibits signatory parties from
practicing coercion or intimidation while doing so.80 In addition to treaty law,
U.S. statutory law codifies standards for treatment of POWs.81 Expert opinion
holds that a “detaining state is not obliged to provide [judicial] review . . . of
POW internment as long as active hostilities are ongoing, because enemy
combatant status denotes that a person is ipso facto a security threat.”82
Treaty law also provides rules regarding civilians during an international
armed conflict. Civilians may be interned “only if security of the Detaining
Power makes it absolutely necessary.”83 Some civilians who are not normally
members of their country’s armed forces may take up the fights as individuals
or irregular units. International legal experts agree that civilians “who directly
77. See id. at art. 21 (stating that “[t]he Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to
internment. It may impose on them the obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp
where they are interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter”).
Although the Third Geneva Convention permits internment in camp facilities, it does not permit
internment in a penitentiary. Id. at art. 22 (stating that, “[e]xcept in particular cases which are
justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries”).
78. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (prohibiting inhumane treatment
of prisoners including, among other things, “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment”); Second Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3
(same); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (same); Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 69, at art. 3 (same).
79. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at arts. 26–29.
80. Id. at art. 17 (“Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give
only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial
number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render
himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status. . . . No physical or
mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be
threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. . . . The
questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.”).
81. Conduct by U.S. military personnel toward POWs is regulated by Article 93 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 893 (forbidding “cruelty toward, or
oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to orders [or the accused] . . . .”). U.S.
implementation of the Geneva Conventions with respect to POWs is found primarily in U.S.
Army Regulation (AR) 190-8 (requiring humane treatment of “all persons captured, detained,
interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Armed Forces custody during the course of conflict.”).
82. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17.
83. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 42.
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participate in hostilities”—such as some “insurgents” in Iraq who were not
members of the regular Iraqi military—fall into the category of posing an
immediate threat and may be detained in accord with the law of war. 84
Regarding other civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities, only in
narrowly construed circumstances may non-combatant civilians legally be
subject to “assigned residence” or internment.85 Under treaty law, an interned
civilian bystander, unlike a POW or a civilian combatant, has the right to
challenge his or her detention before a court or tribunal and the right to
automatic review of the need for his or her continued detention at least twice
per year. 86 Whether soldier, insurgent, or civilian under international law
regulating international armed conflict, an individual’s legal detention ends
when combat hostilities end, 87 even if insurgency survives state-to-state
combat.88 The law of war governing international armed conflict provides a
clear legal framework for detainees.
C. Non-International Armed Conflict
In contrast to the clear provisions regarding detention during international
armed conflicts, international law is less specific with regard to detention
during non-international armed conflicts.89 An individual non-state actor, or
one who acts against a state on behalf of a non-state grouping, is not
considered a “lawful enemy combatant,” and if detained, is not considered a

84. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17.
85. Id.
86.
Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be
entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court
or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the
[i]nternment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or
administrativ[]e []board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give
consideration to his or her case with a view to the favourable amendment of the
initial decision, if circumstances permit.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 43.
87. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall
be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”); Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 69, at art. 46 (stating that internment of civilians in a non-international
armed conflict must cease “as soon as possible after the close of hostilities”); Hague Convention
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 20, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803,
1817, 187 Consol. T.S. 429 (requiring the release of POWs as soon as possible “[a]fter the
conclusion of peace”).
88. See, e.g., Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, (No. 27021/08), 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092
(holding that a state could not hold combatants in preventive detention after state-to-state
hostilities had ceased, even if an insurgency continued).
89. See ICRC, supra note 72, at 17–18 (acknowledging that Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II do not enumerate grounds for detention or procedural rights in
non-international armed conflict).
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POW.90 How are states obligated to treat such detainees? Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions still applies and provides minimum standards for
treatment of any person detained by a state party to the treaty (such as the
United States), whether the conflict is an international armed conflict or not.91
Common Article 3 provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions: (I) Persons taking no active part in the
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To
this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and
cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to
the conflict.92
Past U.S. practice was to train its military forces up to the highest Geneva
standards and to conduct detention accordingly, whether a conflict was an
international armed conflict or not.93 The rationale was to reduce confusion for
U.S. soldiers. Instead of training to various standards for different kinds of
conflicts or combatants, the U.S. military trained to one standard that would

90. Id. at 16 (“POWs are essentially combatants captured by the adverse party in an IAC
[international armed conflict].”).
91. See Common Article Three, supra note 70. But see IF-ASKED GUIDANCE, supra note
64, at 2 (“[T]he United States Armed Forces have treated, and will continue to treat, all
individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention,
even though neither al-Qaida nor Taliban detainees are entitled to POW status. Even though the
Guantanamo detainees are not entitled to POW rights and privileges, they are provided, as a
matter of policy, many privileges similar to POWs.” (emphasis added)).
92. Common Article Three, supra note 70.
93. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 6–7, 165–80 (1956).
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always conform with its Geneva commitments. 94 This eliminated the
possibility, for example, that U.S. soldiers might have to make battlefield
judgments about the identity—and hence treatment—of an enemy. It also
reduced confusion for soldiers deployed to various conflicts or dealing with
fluid situations. The Bush administration eliminated some bright-line
distinctions in legal opinions issued at its highest levels,95 resulting, it seems,
in confusion among troops on the ground and, some propose, a consequent
lowering of standards of detainee treatment.96
The Common Article III guarantees of minimum standards for material
conditions of detention and detainee treatment do not include procedures for an
individual to challenge categorization as a threat, terrorist, or accomplice;
review of continued detention, whether a combatant or non-combatant;97 nor
other procedural safeguards for those detained in a non-international armed
conflict. 98 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions explicitly
provides guidance for treatment of those in detention and internment, 99
implicitly confirming that deprivation of liberty is acceptable practice in
non-international armed conflict. However, like Common Article III,
Additional Protocol II fails to provide legally acceptable grounds or limits for
internment or to create other procedural rights for detainees.100
One last legally murky area deserves consideration: armed conflict against a
non-state actor that crosses borders.101 Could the United States legally detain
suspected terrorists rounded up in Bosnia, Pakistan, Yemen, or elsewhere in
operations against al Qaeda and affiliates? If non-international armed conflict
can transcend borders, as the United States argues in the face of international
disagreement, the United States may legally apprehend a suspected terrorist

94. See, e.g., id.; THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
§ 6.2.5 (1995).
95. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 2–4 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Torture Memo]; see also
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, supra note 31; infra note 102 and accompanying text.
96. See MG ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, DEPUTY COMMANDING GEN. SUPPORT, COAL. FORCES
LAND COMPONENT COMMAND, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE
BRIGADE 12 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT], available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs
/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/taguba/TAGUBA_REPORT_CERTIFICATIONS.pdf;
see
also Interview by Washington Media Associates with Maj. Gen. Thomas Romig (Nov. 19, 2007),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv /torturingdemocracy/interviews/thomas_romig.html;
infra Part III.D.
97. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17.
98. Davidson & Gibson, supra note 8, at 337.
99. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 5, June 18, 1977, 1124 U.N.T.S.
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
100. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17.
101. See supra Part II.C (discussing non-international armed conflict that transcends
borders).
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outside of the zone of combat in Afghanistan and hold him or her in POW-like
preventive detention. If not, such U.S. conduct could constitute kidnapping.102
Legally acceptable grounds for detention and how it may be imposed,
challenged, or terminated during a non-international armed conflict are not
specified under existing international law. 103 However, international law is
clear on the maximum possible length of legal detention and holds a uniform
standard for international and non-international armed conflicts. Detention or
internment, whether of a combatant or civilian, ends with hostilities.104
D. Beyond Geneva: Other Law Informing U.S. Detention Practice
Beyond the Geneva Conventions, other legal instruments shape U.S. practice
of detention and the activities of its tribunals. With relevance to interrogative
detention, reinforcing the prohibition on coercion or intimidation in
questioning POWs, 105 the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and

102. U.S. legal opinion differs. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004)
(stating that kidnapping and detention may not be a violation of international norms). The U.S.
government has extended the same argument regarding non-international armed conflict to assert
the legality of targeted killing, outside of the Afghan theater. If non-international armed conflict
can transcend borders, then U.S. lethal drone attacks in Yemen, for example, may be incident to
the war in Afghanistan and permitted under international law; if not, then U.S. drone attacks in
Yemen may constitute murder or assassination, and are unlawful. See generally Bill Roggio, US
Drones Strike Again in Yemen, Killing 6 AQAP Fighters near Capital, THE LONG WAR JOURNAL
(Jan.
23,
2013),
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/us_drones_strike_aga_5.php
(reporting on recent drone strikes by the United States against al Qaeda fighters in Yemen and
noting that “Obama administration officials have claimed . . . that the drones are targeting only [al
Qaeda] leaders and operatives who pose a direct threat to the US homeland”). The Bush and the
Obama administrations rest their claims of legality on the AUMF. Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006));
see also Koh, supra note 33 (stating the Obama administration’s position that “a state that is
engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with
legal process before the state may use lethal force. . . . [U]nder domestic law, the use of lawful
weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific
high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not
unlawful, and hence does not constitute ‘assassination.’”); Holder, supra note 74 (asserting that
“legal” targeted killings during a borderless war are not assassinations).
103. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17.
104. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at arts. 85, 99, 129, 199; see also supra
note 87.
105.
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial
number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he willfully infringes this rule, he
may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or
status.
...
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of
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Degrading Treatment (CAT), to which the United States is a party, erects an
absolute bar to the practice of torture against detainees.106 The U.S. ban on
torture is incorporated into U.S. law by statute.107
However, Bush administration legal opinions blurred this bright-line
renunciation of torture. As set forth in the “Torture Memos” promulgated by
Bush appointees to the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC),
the OLC introduced “specific intent” as an element of torture. 108 Thus,
according to the OLC, inflicting pain on a detainee in U.S. custody would not
amount to torture if the abuser’s intent was to extract information rather than to
mistreat. 109 Although subsequent Bush administration OLC appointees
withdrew the OLC legal opinion expressed in these “Torture Memos,” 110
confusion persisted among front-line U.S. troops as to what standard was to
guide treatment of detainees in their custody.111 Just one day after his first
inauguration, President Obama officially renounced torture, repudiated the
previous OLC decisions, and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to
Geneva Common Article 3 treatment for detainees.112
war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
...
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they
understand.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 17.
106. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (entered into force
June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT]; see also SENATE TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 5–14 (1988)
(expressing the United States’ understanding of the CAT). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2006).
Congress enacted §§ 2340–2340A to carry out the United States’ obligations under the CAT. See
H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 229 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 398, 472.
107. See supra note 106.
108. Torture Memo, supra note 95, at 3–4. The OLC concluded that the statute’s specific
intent requirement meant that inflicting severe pain or suffering be the defendant’s “precise
objective,” and acting with knowledge that such pain “was reasonably likely to result from his
actions” did not satisfy specific intent. Id., repudiated by Memorandum from the Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to the Deputy Att’y Gen. n.27 (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter
Repudiation Memo] (“We do not reiterate that test here.”).
109. Torture Memo, supra note 95 (specifying conduct for interrogation that, per the OLC,
would be considered legal under the statutory prohibition of torture).
110. Repudiation Memo, supra note 108, at n.27.
111. See infra Part III.D.
112. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 199, 201 (2010) (“From this day forward, unless the
Attorney General with appropriate consultation provides further guidance, officers, employees,
and other agents of the United States Government may, in conducting interrogations, act in
reliance upon Army Field Manual 2-22.3, but may not, in conducting interrogations, rely upon
any interpretation of the law governing interrogation . . . issued by the Department of Justice
between September 11, 2001, and January 20, 2009.”); see also id., 3 C.F.R. 199, 200 (“Common
Article 3 Standards as a Minimum Baseline. Consistent with the requirements of the Federal
torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A, section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42
U.S.C. 2000dd, the Convention Against Torture, Common Article 3, and other laws regulating the
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Another provision guiding the treatment of detainees taken into U.S.
custody, Article 3 of the CAT, bars the United States from deporting any
person to a country that would subject that person to torture.113 The CAT was
formulated with the prevention of torture in mind, but has had the unintended
effect of hampering the release of some Guantanamo detainees otherwise
cleared by CSRTs or other tribunals, if deemed “more likely than not” to face
mistreatment by their home government upon repatriation.114
III. CONCEPTUAL CONTOURS OF DETENTION
Existing law and its gaps have informed U.S. experimentation with detention
as a tactic in the fight against a non-state adversary since September 2001. A
wide variety of practices have been tried out in a relatively short time span;
more careful reflection on detention, based on observation of actual practice by
the executive branch, is overdue. The discussion below is informed by the
concept of the liminal phase, introduced by French social scientist Arnold van
Gennep in his analysis of rites de passage.115 By rite de passage, van Gennep
meant a ritual process that accompanies change of place, state, and social
position such as a wedding, funeral, or, in terms of detention, a trial.116 Van
Gennep identified three phases in a rite de passage: separation, liminality, and
reattachment.117 The first and last phases “detach ritual subjects from their old
places in society and return them, inwardly transformed and outwardly
changed.”118 The middle, or liminal, phase is by definition located between

treatment and interrogation of individuals detained in any armed conflict, such persons shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely and shall not be subjected to violence to life and person
(including murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture), nor to outrages upon
personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment), whenever such individuals are
in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the
United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a
department or agency of the United States.”).
113. CAT, supra note 106, at art. 3.1 (prohibiting state parties from expelling, or refouling,
any person to a state “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger
of being subjected to torture”).
114. United States Reservations to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at II.(2) (Oct. 21, 1994),
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=
en# (“[T]he United States understands the phrase, ‘where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture,’ as used in article 3 of the
Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured.’”).
115. ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE (Monika B. Vizedome & Gabrielle L.
Caffee trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1960) (1909).
116. See id.
117. Victor Turner, Variations on a Theme of Liminality, in BLAZING THE TRAIL: WAY
MARKS IN THE EXPLORATION OF SYMBOLS 48, 48 (Edith Turner ed., 1992) [hereinafter Turner,
Variations]; see also Victor Turner, Morality and Liminality, in BLAZING THE TRAIL, supra, at
132, 133 [hereinafter Turner, Morality] (discussing van Gennep’s work).
118. Turner, Variations, supra note 117, at 48–49.
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established politico-jural states.119 Those in the liminal phase “evade ordinary
cognitive classification, too, for they are not this or that, here or there, one
thing or the other.”120 Liminal subjects exist in a state of potentiality.
As illustration, consider ordinary criminal procedure as a right of passage: a
crime occurs or is alleged to have occurred; an investigation identifies
suspects; an accusation turns a “suspect” into an “accused;” a trial turns an
“accused” into a person adjudged guilty or not guilty. In this schematic,
detention is a liminal state. Conceptualizing detention as a liminal state allows
for an analysis of its features under three categories of practice—criminal
detention, preventive detention, and interrogative detention—that have
emerged in the exercise of executive power since 9/11. One particular
institution—the tribunal—has come to play a key role in this rite de passage.
“Tribunal” refers to a set of decision-makers more broad than military
Commissions or formally constituted courts. This Article uses “tribunal” to
include any body convened to consider known facts, within categories set by
law, to decide the disposition of a particular individual in the context of the
United States’ war against al Qaeda and its allies.121 Detention does not start
without a tribunal. For example, a group of executive branch employees,
normally functioning either in a military or intelligence capacity, is convened.
They may work simultaneously together, as in a night raid or CVITs
conference call, or consecutively and apart by drafting, revising, and signing
off on memoranda to decide to subject a person to detention. Tribunals initiate
the liminal state of detention, detaching the liminal subject from a stable state.
Do they play any further role? The answer to this question depends on which
kind of detention is at issue.
A. Criminal Detention
Taking up criminal detention first, consider its primary goal: to bring
someone to trial. This common-sense point bears articulating because it stands
in contrast to the other kinds of detention under consideration. Stated
conversely, trial is the one recognized legitimate purpose of criminal detention.
Accusation casts a suspect into a liminal state, which a trial verdict terminates.
For a person in the liminal status of “the accused,” a trial is the final step in a
rite de passage for reattachment to a stable status. “Reattachment” does not
have to mean a return to the person’s former status, exonerated and free,
restored to his or her former position in a social milieu. “Reattachment” can
also mean attachment to a stable social status that is new for the person
undergoing the rite de passage. The trial may end in an accused being
pronounced guilty and incarcerated. The new, stable social status is one of
119. The liminal phase takes its name from the Latin term “limen,” literally meaning a
“threshold.” Id. at 49.
120. Id.
121. See generally Eppinger, supra note 7, at 1162–73 (providing a more in-depth
consideration of the role of tribunals in the three modes of detention).
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“convict,” and the new milieu is prison. Military commissions serve the
function of providing the exit process from the liminal state of detention—for
ending the limbo—by rendering a verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty.” Civilian
criminal courts could serve the same function if Congress were to allow the
executive to transfer criminally accused detainees held outside of the United
States to stand trial in the United States.
Whether bound for a trial by military commission trying war crimes or by a
civilian criminal court, the goal of criminal detention is to hold suspects for
trial. Those concerned with it are occupied with procedures for achieving
“fairness” at trial. Even those unconcerned with protecting the civil liberties of
suspected terrorists have an interest in fairness, acting in the belief that the
criminal procedures devised to assure fair trials are also those that best allow
the truth to emerge through an adversarial process. In other words, “fairness”
need not be an end in itself; it may serve a function in the production of truth,
which then helps to assure that the government has “got the right guy,” a
question of particular salience for those seeking to imprison conspirators in
past or planned terrorist attacks. Because of this concern with fairness and
belief in a certain process (adversarial trial) for the production of truth (held
even by those unsympathetic to detainees in U.S. custody), the emphasis by
civil liberties advocates in the U.S. legal community on fair trials was not
misguided per se. It would, however, apply only to a small fraction of U.S.
detainees, i.e., those intended for trial.122
B. Preventive Detention
Criminal detention, where trial provides a clear exit to the liminal state of
detention, has been the exceptional practice in war-on-terror detention. In
contrast to the small proportion of detainees held for criminal detention, some
were treated more like traditional POWs, a situation in which detention is
meant to render a combatant hors de combat. For a side holding combatants it
might otherwise face on a battlefield, the function served by detention in this
case is prevention.123 Preventive detention is allowed, and even encouraged,
under the international law of war.124 After all, the point of the law of war is to
facilitate an end to hostilities in order to minimize suffering.125 Removing
combatants from the battlefield was seen as a means to that end, and over the
course of the twentieth century, international law developed techniques to

122. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
123. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–20 (2004) (stating that at least one
acceptable rationale for detaining lawful and unlawful combatants is to remove them from the
battlefield and thus prevent their return to battle).
124. The Obama administration has referred to this as “law of war detention.” See, e.g.,
Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 34.
125. See INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 4–5
(Keith E. Puls ed., 2005) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK].

2013]

Detention in the War on Terror

349

guarantee the minimum living standards for those held as POWs, in part, to
encourage surrender in international armed conflict.
Several particular features complicate preventive detention in the present
conflict. First, whereas the laws of war for preventive detention during
international armed conflict are well developed, regulation of detention in
non-international armed conflict is an undeveloped area of international law,
as outlined above. 126 The classification of the conflict in Afghanistan as
international or non-international armed conflict is itself disputed.127 Given the
different features of various war-fighting environments over the last decade of
hostilities, the experience of U.S. soldiers and their detainees could differ
widely between theaters. Detainees in U.S. custody during the war in Iraq, an
international armed conflict, might be held subject to a well-developed body
of regulation. 128 Even with widely accepted regulations and systems for
monitoring compliance in place, detainee treatment suffered.129 Detainees held
as a result of the hostilities in Afghanistan, potentially categorized as a
non-international armed conflict, lacked even that clarity.130
Complicating matters further in this conflict is the potential for indefinite
detention.131 The international law of war regulating preventive detention was
not written with the possibility of endless war in mind. In a typical
international armed conflict, war as a formal legal state has a clear beginning
with a state’s declaration of war and a clear end with its offer or acceptance of
surrender.132 The current hostilities against al Qaeda are different. The U.S.
government adopted the position that hostilities could continue indefinitely
and, therefore, preventive detention could also legally continue indefinitely.133
The liminal state—the limbo status—could extend in perpetuity. Even
American citizens could be held by their government without charge in
126. See supra Part II.C.; see also, e.g., Waxman, supra note 4, at 344–49.
127. See LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 84–86; see also supra notes 74–75
and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69.
129. See, e.g., TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 96. Cf. Scott Shane, No Charges Filed in Two
Deaths Involving C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules-out-prosecutions-in-cia-interrogations.html?
ref=abughraib (reporting the Justice Department’s decision not to prosecute intelligence or
military personnel involved in the deaths of two prisoners in Afganistan and Iraq that were the
result of torture and inhuman conditions).
130. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69; LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at
84–86.
131. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–21 (2004) (acknowledging the potential for
indefinite detention in a theoretically indefinite war).
132. See, e.g., LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 4, 8–9.
133. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999,
Addendum (United States of America) Annex 1, at 47, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (May 6,
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/62175.pdf, cited in Waxman,
supra note 4, at 344.
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perpetuity if the U.S. government satisfies certain preconditions for preventive
detention of citizens.134 The Supreme Court majority in Hamdi specified a few
procedural guarantees to an American citizen detained pursuant to hostilities
conducted under the auspices of Congress’s AUMF,135 but those guarantees
should not obscure the bottom line on U.S. detention jurisprudence: Hamdi
allows preventive detention for the duration of a conflict, following the
established rule for POWs in international armed conflict, even in the case of a
non-traditional conflict that could last indefinitely.136
Non-Americans face an even grimmer reality, unaided by the Hamdi
procedures for challenging categorization as an enemy combatant that extend
only to the small category of American citizens.137 For non-Americans held in
preventive detention at Guantanamo Bay, the Obama administration has
instituted Periodic Review Boards (PRBs) to assess whether holding a detainee
is “necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the United
States.”138 At an initial PRB review hearing, each detainee has an opportunity
to introduce additional information for the Board to weigh in determining
whether the facts warrant continued preventive detention. 139 Subsequently,
Defense officials, with input from intelligence and other agencies, may
compile additional information and revisit whether it justifies continued
detention.140 This process highlights a new difference between criminal and
preventive detention. It tasks the Detaining Power with gathering evidence
that could exculpate the “defendant.” Unlike practitioners in the criminal law
domain who seek to ascertain a fixed truth and convict or exonerate
accordingly, practitioners in the national security domain deal in fleeting
truths. Their goal is to assess accurately the threat of a given moment and
protect against it as effectively as possible, without wasting resources on
134. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518–21 (recognizing the potential for indefinite detention under the
executive branch’s authority to detain enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan under the
auspices of the AUMF).
135. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) (defining the scope of the hostilities broadly,
stating that “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons” responsible for 9/11). Those guarantees are that the
government provide an American-citizen detainee with: notice of a categorization like “enemy
combatant” upon which detention is based; the chance to rebut that categorization; and a “neutral
decision maker” to hear the challenge to the categorization. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
136. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519–21 (noting the possibility of indefinite, or perpetual, preventive
detention of American citizens apprehended in Afghanistan).
137. Id. at 532–34 (limiting the holding to a citizen detainee). See also Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 795–98 (2008) (holding that non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo may invoke the
fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus in order to pursue review by a civilian judge
of the detainee’s status as an enemy combatant, which, if upheld, justifies detention until the end
of hostilities, per President Bush’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002)).
138. Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 34.
139. Id. § 3(a).
140. Id. § 3(a)(4).
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bygones and has-beens. Risk—not retribution or justice—figures prominently
in the rationale. Temporality is key. Preventive detention makes sense only
against a present or future instigator of harm. However, under the present
scheme, resources are not expended in continuous reassessment. A PRB
conducts an initial review hearing to assess whether continued detention of a
Guantanamo detainee meets the standard of protecting the United States
against a significant threat, at that moment. While the risk that a particular
detainee poses will change with rapidly changing facts on the ground, as well
as the detainees own capacities and intentions, the PRB does not conduct
another full hearing to assess the threat posed by the detainee for three more
years. Between triennial hearings, the PRB merely reviews the detainee’s file
twice per year.141
Some information about review of the continued preventive detention at
Guantanamo Bay has come into the public domain since the Obama
administration formalized and published the procedures.142 Far less is known
about review of preventive detention at the DFIP facility in Afghanistan, where
the United States holds many more detainees. 143 Some public information
comes from court filings in Bagram detainee habeas actions.144 An Enemy
Combatant Review Board, a five-officer panel, reviews the case of each person
brought to the DFIP for long-term confinement and decides by majority vote
whether the detainee should be held.145 Continued detention is reviewed every
six months as at Guantanamo Bay. 146 Matthew Waxman, a former Bush
administration Department of Defense official with some purview over
detainee affairs, writes: “[T]he processes US forces eventually put in place [in
Afghanistan] roughly track the requirements of [the Fourth Geneva
Convention] Article 78, which calls for, among other things, regular processes
and periodic review (at least every six months) for security internees.”147
141. See id. § 3(b)–(c). The biannual review interval meets the Fourth Geneva Convention’s
standard for review of continued internment of a civilian during armed conflict. Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 69, at art. 78.
142. Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 34, § 3 (explaining the detainee review process).
143. Waxman, supra note 4, at 350 (providing information on Bagram review procedures
used after 2006; those used before this period are even murkier).
144. See id. at 350 & 356 n.41 (citing Declaration of Colonel James W. Gray ¶¶ 11–13, Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-01669 (D.D.C. 2007) (discussing the review process for detainees
in Afghanistan); Declaration of Colonel Rose M. Miller ¶¶ 10–12, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No.
06-C-01707 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing detention procedures and the review process for enemy
combatants detained in Afghanistan)); see also Monica Eppinger, Military Tribunals: A Critical
Assessment, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153, 1170–71 (2012).
145. See, e.g., Eppinger, supra note 144, at 1170–71 (“Each individual brought to theater
detention facilities for long-term confinement has his case reviewed by an Enemy Combatant
Review Board, a five-officer panel that recommends by majority vote whether the detainee be
held in continued detention. We can infer that each person’s continued detention is reviewed
once every six months. . . .”).
146. See Waxman, supra note 4, at 350.
147. Id.
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The agreement between the United States and Afghanistan over the transfer
of the Parwan facility left two issues unresolved that illustrate gaps in
international law regulating preventive detention. The first issue concerns
third-country detainees. The MOU explicitly limits the transfer of detainees to
“Afghan nationals.” 148 During an August 5, 2010 news conference, Vice
Admiral Robert Harward indicated that the United States would retain
decisional authority over non-Afghan detainees, stating, “[o]ur first preference
is to repatriate them back to their host countries; if not, prosecute them in the
Afghan legal system.” 149 Although Admiral Harward would not provide a
precise number of third-country detainees, he indicated that “there [were] less
than 50 [and that] [s]eventy-five percent come from Pakistan.” 150 The
non-governmental organization Human Rights First estimates that there are
forty-one third-country non-Afghan detainees at the DFIP.151 In January 2012,
the United States was reportedly considering repatriation of the
third-country detainees in anticipation of Afghan authorities lacking interest
in practicing criminal or national security detention in their cases. 152 The
ongoing interplay between risk calculations and desire to comport with treaty
obligations, both part of the ethical formulation of national security
practitioners, is evident: repatriation of third-country DFIP detainees is
apparently predicated on successfully negotiating post-transfer monitoring and
on securing diplomatic assurances that “detainees will not be abused when they
return home.”153
The second unresolved issue concerns decisional authority over detainee
release. The MOU requires the government of Afghanistan to “consider
favorably” any U.S. assessments that a detainee should not be released. 154
There is some question as to whether this gives the United States a de
facto veto over Afghan release decisions.155 The U.S. government reportedly
believes that it can block the release of detainees as long as its forces are in

148. MOU, supra note 49, at para. 4.
149. Admiral Harward is the Commander of Joint Task Force-435, which operates the DFIP.
See DOD News Briefing with Vice Adm. Harward and Ambassador Klemm from Afghanistan,
U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript
.aspx?transcriptid=53002 [hereinafter DOD News Briefing].
150. Id.
151. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DETAINED AND DENIED IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW TO MAKE
U.S. DETENTION COMPLY WITH THE LAW 3 (2011).
152. Peter Finn & Julie Tate, Some Held at U.S.-Run Prison in Afghanistan Could Return
Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2012, at A11. (“Afghan authorities are unlikely to have any interest
in either continuing to hold [them] or [in] putting them on trial”).
153. Id.
154. MOU, supra note 49, at para. 9.
155. Rod Nordland, Detainees Are Handed over to Afghans, But Not out of Americans’
Reach, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A4 (“When asked whether that structure basically gave the
Americans veto power on detainees releases, the [U.S.] official said, ‘That’s your word, not
mine.’”).
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Afghanistan.156 Alternatively, the Afghan DFIP commander does not believe
that such a veto exists, as it would undermine Afghan sovereignty. 157 The
ambiguity may be intentionally embedded. One U.S. official stated that the
MOU was written thus “‘because the U.S. in Kabul is speaking to two
audiences with contradictory interests: Congress, which does not want
Afghanistan to release anybody they want, and the Afghans, who want
sovereignty.’”158
C. Interrogative Detention
In a war in which detention has been so widely practiced, three motivating
logics have emerged. Prosecution is dwarfed in comparison with prevention in
both frequency and prominence. The widespread practice of preventive
detention during this series of conflicts is consistent with twentieth-century
experience in conventional war, although its importance as a war-fighting
doctrine against “insurgency” and in war against non-state actors may have
grown. What emerged in a new way during the “war on terror” was detention
motivated by the prospect of gathering intelligence interrogative detention.
Although certainly present in U.S. practices of detention in past conflicts,
interrogative detention became prevalent—and in some manifestations, more
openly acknowledged in this conflict than in any other since the 1929 Geneva
Conventions.159
One reason stems from the inception of the war and the nature of the foe.
9/11 was diagnosed, in part, as a failure of intelligence, and the executive
branch intelligence agencies sought to remedy that failure, in part, by gathering
as much intelligence as possible.160 The executive branch pursued individuals
for interrogative detention in two different ways, in service of two different
ends. First, after the surprise attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government and its allies
reacted as if to a great crime scene, detaining many individuals, the equivalent
of material witnesses detained for what they were expected to know. 161

156. Id. (“‘Absolutely we have veto power.’”).
157. Id. (stating that Afghan General Ghulam Farouq insisted that the United States did not
hold veto power).
158. Id.
159. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention of 1929)
(July 27, 1929) art. 5 (besides name and rank, stating that “no pressure shall be exercised on
prisoners to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country”).
160. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION
REPORT
(2011),
available
at
http://www.9-11commission.
gov/report/911Report.pdf.
161. In at least one case, a detainee was originally held—literally—as a material witness.
American citizen Jose Padilla was held as a material witness for the grand jury investigation into
the 9/11 attacks from his detention at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport on May 8, 2002, until his
designation as an “enemy combatant” and transfer to a U.S. military detention facility on June 9,
2002. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005).
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Specific individuals were identified, sought, detained, and interrogated. 162
Although itself a matter of controversy, the practice of seeking information
from war detainees was seen by some as an extension of accepted practice.
The Department of Defense designated the Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, as a “strategic intelligence gathering center.”163 It instructed Combatant
Commanders performing war-on-terror missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, or
elsewhere not to view Guantanamo as a destination for those whom Combatant
Commanders apprehended but considered “low-level Enemy Combatants who
pose only a tactical force protection threat;” instead, the Guantano facility was
intended for detainees considered to be of “high operational or strategic
intelligence or law enforcement value.” 164 The Department of Defense
developed extensive guidelines outlining the division of labor between guards,
military police, and interrogators at Guantanamo; even specifying conduct
by interpreters thought to facilitate intelligence gathering.165 Reviews were
conducted to monitor that actual practice followed guidance.166
162. The U.S. policy of seeking highly valued targets for intelligence gathering—formerly
referred to as high payoff targets (HPTs)—predates the “war on terror.” See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL FM 34-52 INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 1-7 to 1-15 (1992), available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/additional_detainee_documents
/07-F-2406%20doc%2010.pdf. The U.S. military developed and vetted those interrogation
techniques in an attempt to meet Geneva and other law-of-war standards as well as the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Id.
163. See Memorandum from Office of Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Special Operations/Low
Intensity Conflict (ASDSO/LIC), Criteria and Guidelines for Screening and Processing Persons
Detained by the Department of Defense in Connection with the War on Terror (Aug. 22, 2003), at
3 [hereinafter Criteria and Guidelines Memo], available at http://www.dod.mil/
pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/04-F-0269%20Criteria%20and%20Guidelines%20for%2
0Screening%20and%20Processing%20Persons%20Detained%20by%20the%20DoD%20in%20C
onnection%20with%20the%20War%20on%20Terrorism.pdf.
The Memorandum was
promulgated, for example, by cable to field command and detention facility commanders in Cable
632132 from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Memorandum on Criteria and Guidelines for
Screening and Processing Persons Detained by the DOD in Connection with the War on
(Mar.
3,
2004),
at
para.
III.G,
available
at
Terrorism
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/04-F-0269%20Global%20Screening
%20Guidance.pdf.
164. See supra note 162.
165. JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO (JTF-GTMO), CAMP DELTA STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES sec. 4-20, at 4.3 (2003) [hereinafter GTMO SOP], available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/CampDeltaSOP_dec07.pdf
(“The
purpose of the Behavior Management Plan is to enhance and exploit the disorientation and
disorganization felt by a newly arrived detainee in the interrogation process.”); id. sec. 15-10, at
15.5; id. sec. 15-11, at 15.5 (allowing interpreters to loiter in cell blocks outside of interrogation
sessions and to make observations of such detainee behavior as “reverence toward other
detainees,” “cheering,” “teachers,” and to report observations to the Joint Detention Operations
Group).
166. See, e.g., VICE ADMIRAL A.T. CHURCH III, USN & BRIGADIER GEN. D.D. THIESSEN,
USMC, BRIEF TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS
DETAINED AT NAVAL STATION GUANTANÁMO BAY, CUBA, AND NAVAL CONSOLIDATED BRIG
CHARLESTON (2004) [hereinafter SEC. DEF. BRIEFING], available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi
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Although the bureaucratization of procedures and safeguards may promote
the sense that interrogative detention of “high value detainees” in the “war on
terror” amounts merely to the extension of prior military practice, other
disclosures bar that conclusion. In this conflict, the U.S. government took the
policy of seeking highly valued sources to new lengths. As one example, the
U.S. government devised procedures for “extraordinary rendition”: assumedly
to avoid de jure violation of U.S. domestic and treaty law prohibitions on
physical or psychological harm of detainees in its custody, the U.S.
government targeted and seized persons it believed to have knowledge or
information of national security significance and delivered those individuals to
cooperative governments known to practice torture. 167 One credible source
documented that at least 136 persons had thus been “rendered” by
the U.S. government for torture. 168 At least two cases involved gross
misidentification—one, a case of mistaken identity,169 and another, a case of an
innocent Canadian wrongfully characterized as having terrorist
affiliations 170 —resulting in the torture of men who had no information to
share. Civil suits or government inquiries have won compensation for some
who were rendered and survived, though all such suits in the United States
have been dismissed by the courts on procedural grounds such as state secrets
privilege or judicial deference to the executive in matters of foreign policy.171
/operation_and_plans/Detainee/may04church_secdef.pdf; Memorandum from Admiral J.
Stavridis, U.S. Navy to Mr. Uldric L. Fiore, Jr., Assistant Inspector Gen. & Gen. Counsel, Office
of
the
Inspector
Gen.,
Dep’t
of
Def.
(Feb.
5,
2007),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/09-F-0049_BassettReport.pdf
(detailing an investigation of allegations of detainee abuse stemming from off-duty bragging by
Guantanamo personnel and finding no serious violations of procedure).
167. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary
Rendition” Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 (providing an early report of
“extraordinary rendition”).
168. OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, GLOBALIZING TORTURE: CIA SECRET DETENTION
AND EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 6 (2013), available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org
/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf.
169. See Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 2005, at A1 (discussing the imprisonment of German citizen Khaled el Masri); see also
Case of El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Eur. Ct. H.R., Application No.
39630/09, para. 205 (Dec. 13, 2012) (“The Court observes that on 23 January 2004 the applicant,
handcuffed and blindfolded . . . and subjected to total sensory deprivation . . . was forcibly
marched to a CIA aircraft.”), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages
/search.aspx?i=001=115621.
170. See Mayer, supra note 167, at 106 (discussing the case of Canadian citizen Maher Arar);
see also CANADIAN GOV’T COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT ON THE EVENTS RELATED TO MAHER ARAR 9–10 (2006).
171. There are examples of successful civil suits in foreign courts or foreign governmental
inquiries resulting in compensation. See, e.g., Case of El-Masri, supra note 169; Press Release,
Office of Prime Minister of Can., Prime Minister Releases Letter of Apology to Maher Arar and
His Family and Announces Completion of Mediation Process (Jan. 26, 2007), available at
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1509 (announcing that the Canadian government had issued an
official apology and C$10.5 million plus legal costs in compensation to Arar, arising from the
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Only in Italy have criminal prosecutions been brought against U.S. officials for
kidnapping in connection with extraordinary rendition, resulting in convictions
against all accused.172
In addition to extraordinary rendition, credible sources also report another
extreme departure from past practice under the Bush administration’s conduct
of interrogative detention, namely the U.S. government’s setting up so-called
“Black Sites,” secret facilities established for the interrogative detention of
certain “high-value detainees.”173 Assumedly, these sites were not operated on
U.S. soil. 174 They likely involved U.S. personnel as interrogators. U.S.
Canadian government’s information-sharing with U.S. intelligence agencies and thus the
Canadian government’s complicity with his rendition). U.S. courts have dismissed suits seeking
redress for U.S. government renditions. See El-Masri v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 541
(E.D. Va. 2006) (granting motion to dismiss on an assertion of the state secrets privilege), aff’d,
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (dismissing on several grounds), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and aff’d en
banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
172. The Italian case involved the seizure of Nasr Osama Mustafa Hassan (known as Abu
Omar), an Egyptian cleric who had been granted political asylum in Italy. Abu Omar was seized
on the street in Milan while walking to his mosque, brought to the U.S. airbase in Aviano, flown
to Ramstein, Germany, and thence to Cairo, Egypt, where he alleges he was tortured at an
Egyptian facility. In 2009, an Italian court convicted, in absentia, twenty-three U.S. officials of
Abu Omar’s kidnapping, including Milan CIA station chief Robert Seldon Lady. For summary
and analysis, see Tribunale de Milano (sez. IV pen.) 1° febbraio 2010 n. 12428, on International
Law in Domestic Courts, OUP Reference: ILDC 1492 (IT 2010). Three other U.S.
officials—CIA Rome station chief Jeffrey Castelli and CIA agents operating under diplomatic
cover as First Secretary and Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Rome—were acquitted at
the 2009 trial, but only because they asserted diplomatic immunity. The convictions of the
twenty-three Americans were upheld on appeal before Italy’s highest court in 2012, and their
sentences were increased (from seven to nine years in the case of Milan station chief Robert
Seldon Lady, and from five to seven years in the cases of the other twenty-two). See Timothy
Synhaeve, Taking the War on Terror to Court: A Legal Analysis on the Right to Reparation for
Victims of Extraordinary Rendition, 5 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 439, 469–72 (2011) (describing
procedural maneuvering over state the secrets privilege in the original trial). Due to a
technicality, the Italian government will not seek extradition of any of the convicted.
On February 4, 2013, an appeals court vacated the acquittals of the other three who had
claimed diplomatic immunity in 2009, convicting and sentencing Rome station chief Jeffrey
Castelli to seven years and Americans Betnie Madero and Ralph Russomando to six years each.
See Italian Court Convicts Three Americans in Kidnapping Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2013, at
A6; see also Elisabetta Povoledo, High Court in Italy Backs Convictions for Rendition, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, at A5. The Italian court’s convictions are the only criminal prosecutions
to date for rendition. For an overview and summary of all twenty-six convictions, see Colleen
Barry, Milan Court Convicts Three Americans in CIA Kidnapping, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 3
2013, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202586754294. The convictions in the Italian
court are the only convictions of U.S. officials in connection with rendition, as yet.
173. See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 168, at 15–16 (“President Bush has
stated that about a hundred detainees were held under the CIA secret detention program.”).
174. However, details regarding the detention of a very small number of people at the Naval
Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina, are hazy. See SEC. DEF. BRIEFING, supra note
166, at 15 (noting the “limited detainee population”). Not all identities, beyond now-convicted
criminal Jose Padilla, of those held in interrogative detention at Charleston are available. See
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government officials made extensive efforts to enlist the assistance of foreign
governments, and in the end, fifty-four foreign governments have been
documented as helping the U.S. government in carrying out extraordinary
rendition or in operating “Black Sites.”175
The practice of targeting particular sources thought to be especially
knowledgeable for capture and interrogative detention was pronounced at the
outset of hostilities and in the early years of war. Over a longer span, an
increasing number of al Qaeda leadership had been taken into custody and
were already held; killed in the course of hostilities; or captured, interrogated,
and released. The usefulness of supposed knowledge waned with its
timeliness. As war thinned the ranks of the operational leadership of the
earlier organization, new recruits may have been operating as sympathetic
bands rather than closely integrated affiliates. Information about the methods
used to target particular sources gradually became public, and as such
information spread, the public—or some subsections of it—began to object.176
Some foreign prosecutors secured convictions of U.S. officials.177 During the
2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Obama campaigned against torture,
and when President Obama took office in 2009, his administration renounced it
as a matter of policy, and with it, rendition. 178 Likewise, the Obama
administration ordered the CIA to close any detention facilities it was
operating, i.e., the “Black Sites.”179
Extreme measures involving high-value targets, although significant as
indicators of the lengths the executive has gone to illicit information through
detention, do not demonstrate its breadth. Targeting “high-value” individuals
represents only a fraction of the interrogative detention practiced; although the
United States has reduced the practice, a second way of pursuing sources of
possible information, in service of a different kind of end, has come to the fore:
OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 168, at 5–6; Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane,
Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A1 (reporting
that Padilla was held in the South Carolina brig in isolation for three and a half years). The use of
the Charleston facility for interrogative detention that was not, as far as publicly available sources
reveal, detention primarily for preventive or prosecutorial purposes; and the extent to which the
government has shielded in secrecy its methods of interrogation, the agencies involved, and other
details usually public regarding publicly funded institutions in the United States leads to
speculation about whether to categorize Charleston as the only U.S.-based “Black Site.” See SEC.
DEF. BRIEFING, supra note 166, at 15–16 (mentioning Charleston interrogative detention).
175. See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 168, at 6.
176. For examples of information becoming more widely available, see OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, supra note 168, at 29–30 (providing information that was released or uncovered
about detainees subjected to post-9/11 secret detention and extraordinary rendition). See also
Mayer, supra note 167, at 106–08; Priest, supra note 169, at A25.
177. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
178. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 199, 201 (2009). Critics contend that the Obama
administration policy now is merely to kill suspected terrorists instead of rounding them up for
interrogation.
179. Id.
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interrogative detention as mass practice. Detention in the “war on terror” has
become particularly widespread because of an epistemological shift in the
production of intelligence.
Intelligence analysts now construct a picture of the threat environment, as
one court described, by fitting “thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly
innocuous information . . . into place to reveal with startling clarity how the
unseen whole must operate.” 180 With this “mosaic theory” of intelligence,
where the goal of those conducting the inquiry and investigation is to amass
enough small bits of information to piece together a broader picture of the
threats ahead or the perpetrators behind, a detainee might not even be aware
that he or she knows something useful, or know what to divulge were he or she
inclined to facilitate the process. 181 This departs from both the “grand
criminal” (or war criminal) model and the high-value detainee model. Under
the logic of this process, a “useful” detainee, i.e., one with information within
the scope of relevance, may be held for questioning, even if not a criminal
suspect, and, under a standard of a wide scope of relevance, the greater the
number of detainees, the more sources of mosaic bits, and the more full the
picture composed.182
In a news briefing, Admiral Harward provided a picture of the approach to
mosaic composition, describing the information U.S. officials seek to obtain
from detainees as follows:
Q: Can you tell us what information you routinely seek from
detained, suspected insurgents about where—the source of their
money and what they intend to do with it?
ADM. HARWARD: Well, I would tell you this, I wouldn’t want to
give exactly the information we’re after.
But we talk to every individual detained, through all portions of the
life cycle, not only to identify funding sources, but also ties, and—be
it in government, be it in the insurgency and all other—all other
connections they have, to understand the human terrain and how it
functions here in Afghanistan.

180. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
181. Id. (likening foreign intelligence gathering in an age of computer technology to the
construction of a mosaic). The Department of the Navy, in its Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) regulations, thus defines the theory as “[t]he concept that apparently harmless pieces of
information when assembled together could reveal a damaging picture.” 32 C.F.R. § 701.31
(2005); David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information
Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 651–52 (2005) (detailing how national security information has become
so heterogeneous that “we increasingly do not know what information matters, or who has it, or
how to control it”).
182. See McLoughlin et al., supra note 8, at 476–77 (explaining the concept of preventive
detention and how some detainees are in fact criminals while “others may not have been accused
of crimes”).
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Q: Are you receiving enough of that information as part of the
detainee interview process, or are you trying to get more?
ADM. HARWARD: Well, we use all modes of intelligence to gather
that information. Our strength is having a large population we have
access to, that we can spend a lot of time talking to, and gaining
more fidelity on how those systems and those individuals interact
and how they function.183
In debates over interrogation in the “war on terror,” much has been made of
the “ticking time bomb,” a situation where gaining information about a
pending attack is of the utmost urgency. The perceived nature of the adversary
may have at least as great an influence as instances of perceived urgency have
on the spread of interrogative detention. In other words, states may perceive
an even greater incentive to practice interrogative detention against a non-state
global adversary such as al Qaeda. Unlike the adversary in a traditional
international armed conflict between states, in this conflict, the adversary does
not sit in a capital, with the fixed assets (and penetrable systems) of an
intelligence headquarters, National Security Council, or Politburo; the
“headquarters” of an adversary like al Qaeda might be located in something as
nimble and malleable as a laptop.184 Facing a flexible and fluid adversary,
human sources of information about networks, redundancies, motivations, and
strategies become even more significant for discerning the enemy.185
Against this background of heightened demand for interrogative detention, a
lack of clarity surrounds international legal standards regarding interrogative
detention.186 In fact, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the
organization of experts who are guardians and promulgators of the
international law of war, and some of the states party to the Geneva
Conventions express reluctance to augment laws of war to regulate
interrogation.187 Perhaps the ICRC does not want to make any additions to the
international law of detention that could blur the bright-line prohibition of
torture.188
Interrogative detention is a practice area marked by several features. One is
scant regulation in international law (besides the bright-line prohibition against

183. DOD News Briefing, supra note 149.
184. See Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa’ida), COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126
(last updated June 6, 2012).
185. See Pozen, supra note 181, at 651–52.
186. See, e.g., ICRC Background Document, supra note 11, at 4–6.
187. See id. at 5–6 (discussing a planned resolution for the 2011 Quadrennial Review to
ensure better legal protection of persons detained for security reasons during non-international
armed conflicts, but expressing the reservation of some States of the need to develop new treaty
rules).
188. CAT, supra note 106.
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torture) and thus the absence of legal liability for violating regulatory norms.189
Another, a matter more of policy than of law, is an absence of procedures for
evaluating the utility of interrogation and procedures for terminating the
detention.190 Under a mosaic theory of intelligence, the executive branch has a
continued incentive to keep a detainee in custody, even if the detainee has no
further apparent value for intelligence; for example, after his or her
operationally significant knowledge would have been overtaken by events on
the ground. 191 This is because, under a mosaic theory of intelligence
collection, a detainee might have some background knowledge that could
provide “missing piece” details to a larger picture that the intelligence
community is trying to assemble.192
D. The Bleed
Distinguishing between modes of detention provides conceptual clarity, but
one should recognize that, in practice, executive branch authorities do not
always keep these modes distinct from one another.193 Authorities may take a
detainee into custody for one purpose but continue detention for a different
purpose,194 or they may leverage the different modes of detention to coerce
detainee cooperation.195
For example, three months after the inception of the war in Afghanistan and
fifteen months before the war in Iraq, the Bush administration had formulated a
plan to leverage the liminal state in order to encourage cooperation by
detainees in U.S. custody.196 The idea was to encourage detainees to provide
189. See Freedman, supra note 9, at 329–39 (opining that, because international human rights
law for security detention is derived from many different texts, the regulations are vague,
uncertain, or inconsistent).
190. For a concurring view, see Davison & Gibson, supra note 8, at 326–27, 371–72.
191. For commentary on this practice, see Ryan Goodman, Rationales for Detention:
Security Threats and Intelligence Value, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 373, 375–79 (2009) (critiquing the
recent trend of using security detainees for information gathering purposes, even though such
practice conflicts with international human rights law). See also Pozen, supra note 181, at
630–31.
192. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
193. See Criteria and Guidelines Memo, supra note 163, sec. 4, at 3 (directing combatant
commanders to assess all those over whom he or she gains control for threat to the United States,
for high operational or strategic intelligence, or for law enforcement value to the United States; a
detainee could fit within any, all, or none of the categories).
194. See Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 367–68 (2001)
(statement of ACLU, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice Oversight Hearing].
195. See, e.g., GTMO SOP, supra note 165, sec. 29-1 (specifying procedures for moving a
detainee between blocks within the Guantanamo facility of greater or lesser deprivation and
strictness as part of the bureaucratization of leveraging differing standards of treatment to induce
detainee cooperation with interrogation and other matters).
196. The plan outlined in this paragraph was explained in a telephone interview with
former Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre-Richard Prosper. See Interview with
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information by allowing a prisoner to “graduate” from one level to another:
“Level 1” included high-level threats, meant to be tried by military
commissions for war crimes; “Level 2” were mid-level threats, deemed to
warrant detention and monitoring; and “Level 3” delineated low-level
individuals who could be released.197 This plan depended on the prospect of
indefinite extension of the liminal state as a negative incentive. Note too that
designation as a criminal or war-crimes suspect depended as much upon
assessment of cooperation and future threat as measurement of past criminal
acts; the scheme for Guantanamo depended on a conflation of preventive
detention, interrogative detention, and criminal detention. As the prosecutions
before the military commission were delayed by several years of litigation over
their procedures, however, the Bush administration’s plan unraveled.198
Engaging in different modes of detention, which entail different purposes,
motivations, and practices, under one general umbrella concept can engender
misrecognition, confusion, inappropriate conduct, or illegal detainee
treatment.199 At the Abu Ghraib facility in Iraq, for example, abuse started
with confusion. After its invasion of Iraq, the United States used Abu Ghraib
for criminal detention, preventive detention, and interrogative detention.200 Six
months after the invasion and start of occupation, Major General Miller, the
commander who had overseen operations involving “high-value detainee”
interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, arrived in Iraq to assess U.S.
interrogation operations there and to make proposals for improvement. 201
Miller drew a distinction between tactical interrogation operations (meant to
elicit information useful in day-to-day war-fighting) and strategic interrogation
the Honorable Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 44; see also Dep’t of Justice Oversight
Hearing, supra note 194, at 139–41 (statement of Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper before the
Senate Judiciary Committee). The hearings were conducted to examine the constitutional and
legal implications of the President’s executive order to establish military commissions with
respect to the detention, treatment, and trial of persons accused of terrorist activities. Id.
197. See GTMO SOP, supra note 165, for procedures; see also Telephone Interview with
The Honorable Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 44. (“Detainees could move from level 1 to
level 3, based on their own behavior, based on cooperation or sharing information. At the end of
it detainees needed to see a process with an end. If level 3 becomes a black hole, then that leads
to breakdown in cooperation and all kinds of other problems.”).
198. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 44. See
generally ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 14.
199. For a description of how this mechanism works, and other examples of overgeneralized
language or overextended metaphor leading to certain patterns of thought and actions with
measurable outcomes, see Benjamin Lee Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and
Behaviour to Language, in LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 64, 65–66 (Ben G. Blount ed.,
1995).
200. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 96, at 10.
201. Major General Geoffrey Miller arrived with a team of interrogation and detention
experts from Guantanamo on August 31, 2003, on a ten-day mission. MG GEOFFREY MILLER,
ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN
IRAQ (U) 2 (2003) [hereinafter MILLER ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs
/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/taguba/ANNEX_020_MG_MILLER_REPORT.pdf.
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operations (to yield information about the organization, capabilities, and plans
of al Qaeda and others threatening attacks against the United States).
Transition to a new phase of operations in Iraq entailed an epistemological
shift, in Miller’s Assessment: “transition to strategic interrogation
operations.”202 Although Army regulations and a different recent review of
detention operations (the Ryder Report) specified that “military police ‘do not
participate in military intelligence [MI] supervised interrogations,’” Miller’s
team recommended that the “‘guard force’ be actively engaged in setting the
conditions for successful exploitation of the internees.”203 The Taguba Report
objects that misrecognition marks the Miller Team’s read of the situation and
that the Miller Assessment intentionally, but wrongly, extended Guantanamo
interrogative detention procedures. 204 Procedures that might be considered
appropriate in a facility with an emphasis on interrogative detention could be
inappropriate elsewhere. Certainly, Taguba suggests, lower-ranking guards
might have read the Miller Assessment recommendations as new or conflicting
guidance: “While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not
tasked to set conditions for detainees for subsequent MI (military intelligence)
interrogations, it is obvious . . . this was done at lower levels.”205 Shortly after
Major General Miller’s recommendations were issued and promulgated, some
numbers of the Military Police brigade guarding detainees at Abu Ghraib
engaged in “incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” against
those in their custody.206 Division of labor, training, and professionalization
were called on as solutions to problems inhering to crossover motivations and
practices resulting from a bleed between categories of detention and conduct
considered more or less appropriate to each.
Information revealed in recent court records shows that the Obama
administration has sought to leverage differences between types of detention in
a different manner than the Bush administration had. For example, authorities
conduct one set of interview procedures that do not include reading a detainee
his Miranda rights, a so-called “dirty interview,” which is meant to extract the
maximum amount of actionable intelligence from a detainee, before turning the
detainee over to a different set of questioners who observe the protocols
202. Id. at 4.
203. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 96, at 9.
204. Id. at 8 (“MG Miller’s team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational
procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations and recommendations.
There is a strong argument that the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo
(GTMO) is different than that of detainees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF),” which includes a large
number of Iraqi criminals but not those believed to be international terrorists or knowledgeable
about international terrorist organizations).
205. Id. at 12.
206. Id. at 16. Note that although the Taguba Report condemns the abuse and sanctions by
those it finds responsible, it does not challenge coercive interrogation as a practice. The message
is, rather, to train some for work in preventive and criminal detention and to leave interrogation to
the experts.
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necessary to produce evidence admissible at trial, a so-called “clean
interview.” 207 The admissibility of evidence from a clean interview is
currently being litigated in federal court.208
IV. CONCLUDING PROPOSALS
A. Criminal Detention
The handful of detainees categorized as criminal suspects should be bound
for prosecution. To deal with those held in criminal detention, a robust set of
alternatives already exists. Violations of U.S. criminal law can be tried in U.S.
civilian court, 209 and using the courts to adjudicate these cases arguably
strengthens the rule of law in the United States by using the judiciary for one
of its constitutionally specified functions. A proposal in the 112th Congress to
preclude foreign terrorists’ prosecutions in U.S.-based civilian courts210 runs
directly against the intention of the Bush administration when President Bush
originally authorized military commissions for terrorist suspects in November
2001.211 Ambassador Pierre Prosper, the Bush administration’s representative
to a December 4, 2001, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, stated clearly that
the administration’s position was to add military tribunals to the civilian court
system, in other words, add, not subtract, prosecutorial options for the
executive branch.212 The Obama administration has also made clear that it

207. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Hearing on Terror Suspect Explores Miranda Warning, N.Y
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A31.
208. For a description of “dirty” and “clean” interviews, see generally Sealed Indictment,
United States v. Ahmed, No. 10-cr-00131 (filed Feb. 22, 2010 S.D.N.Y.) (listing charges against
Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed, an alleged conspirator with al Shabab (an alleged affiliate of al
Qaeda), who was apprehended by U.S. agents in Nigeria and brought to trial in the Southern
District of New York) and Benjamin Weiser, Interview Was ‘Clean,’ F.B.I. Agent Testifies, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2011, at A17.
209. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
210. The proposal survived in a compromise form in the FY 2012 Defense Authorization
Act, in a provision diluting the Attorney General’s prosecutorial discretion and directing the
Attorney General to consult with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense about whether federal court or military commission would be a more appropriate venue
for a detainee trial. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-81, § 1029, 125 Stat. 1298, 1569–70 (2011) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note).
211. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918, 918–21 (2002).
212.
Senator SESSIONS. . . . If [the President] thought a trial could be tried in civil district
court, he could allow it to go there? Or he could send it to a military tribunal? Is that
your understanding of [the Executive Order authorizing military commissions]?
Ambassador PROSPER. That is absolutely correct, and I think, again, one thing that I
would like to highlight here is what the President has done is created an option. He has
not ruled out the Federal courts or the Article III courts. He is creating an option. So at
the time that a particular case comes to his desk, he will balance the interests of the
country and make the appropriate decision at that time.
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considers any congressional action to preclude trying terrorists in U.S. federal
courts counterproductive.213
In addition to trying criminal suspects in U.S. federal court, suspected
violators of martial law and the laws of war can be tried in courts martial, a
venue in which Congress prescribes the substantive law (although the
executive establishes procedure). If the federal courts and the courts martial
are found inadequate, an administration can establish military commissions to
try violations of the laws of war,214 as the United States has eventually done in
this conflict. Ad hoc-ism has serious limits and costs, as the last decade’s
experience demonstrates. Military commissions may be a costly and
time-consuming alternative whose advantages to existing tribunals are not
necessarily obvious and the utility claims for which should be reviewed
accordingly.215 Finally, U.S. legal experts and authorities should reconsider
the role of standing international courts, weighing under what circumstances
the United States could benefit from adjudicating detainee cases in an
international tribunal and investing in the development of such a tribunal ahead
of time.
The bottom-line is that institutional options for prosecution are already
familiar. Those subject to criminal detention should be identified and
categorized expediently and prosecuted promptly.
B. Preventive Detention
Preventive detention has been the object of long and serious thought by
states party to the Geneva Conventions. Minimum standards for material
conditions of wartime detainees, for example, are well elaborated. The United
States and other states party to the Conventions developed military regulations
around Geneva Standards. Sudden departures should be met with skepticism.
The obvious proposal regarding those held in preventive detention in the
present conflict follows an undisputed precedent of international law for
international armed conflict.216 At the end of hostilities against al Qaeda, the
United States and its allies should release detainees remaining in preventive
detention, or charge and try detainees for war crimes. The features of war
against a non-state actor and prosecuting conflict in multiple theaters require
adapting the timing of the application of this rule. Detainees should be
released, or charged and tried, when the administration ends hostilities in the
theater in connection with which the detainee was taken into custody. That
Dep’t of Justice Oversight Hearing, supra note 194, at 144 (testimony of Ambassador
Pierre-Richard Prosper).
213. See, e.g., Holder, supra note 74 (“[W]e are not the first administration to rely on federal
courts to prosecute terrorists, nor will we be the last.”).
214. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
215. See Eppinger, supra note 7; see also supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the overarching principle that
detention should cease when hostilities end).
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would mean releasing or charging most Guantanamo detainees when the war
in Afghanistan ends. 217 Detainees whom the United States is holding in
preventive detention at the DFIP in Afghanistan would similarly be formally
charged and tried or released when hostilities cease.218 It is unclear whether
plans to transfer management of the DFIP to Afghan government control
would complicate such action (or expedite it under Afghan authority).
Second, serious consideration should be given to the low rates of recidivism
by those held in preventive detention in Afghanistan. In 2010, Vice Admiral
Harward, U.S./ISAF commander of detainee operations in Afghanistan, said
that of a detainee population numbering over 3,000 in all the years of conflict
in Afghanistan, he had documented only seventeen cases in which those
released from preventive detention returned to the battlefield. 219 That is a
recidivism rate of roughly one-half of one percent. Reasons for that
astonishingly low rate of battlefield recapture need to be investigated and
analyzed. Is the low rate because of treatment or training that took place
during detention? Is it related to community guarantees extracted at the time
of release? Is it because too many were detained in the first place, including
wrong place/wrong time non-combatants? Or is the figure a result of
under-reporting, understandably missing, in the fog of war, released detainees
who did return to the battlefield? Reasons for the low rate of recidivism or, in
the case of the wrongly detained, first-time fighting by released detainees
should be carefully analyzed and lessons extracted for future conduct.
A third proposal is that the length of the conflict, or rather the potential for
indefinite war, demands that rules regarding length of preventive detention be
overhauled. By internationally accepted practice, in the current conflict, the
United States may hold an adversary in preventive detention through hostilities
lasting (thus far) twelve years. Could an adversary be held in preventive
detention throughout a Thirty Years’ War? A Hundred Years’ War?220 The
Detaining Power should be obliged to undertake regular review of the need for,
or utility of, detention. In addition, states should consider shifting the burden
of proof so that, in a conflict of long duration, at some interval, say five years,
217. By the Numbers, supra note 3; The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 22.
218. The Obama administration recently announced plans to transfer the Bagram facility to
Afghan government control. See Nordland, supra note 4, at A9. If the administration declares
hostilities concluded, detainees held in preventive detention should be released, not switched to
detention under local authority. If the administration transfers authority over Bagram before the
conclusion of hostilities, its agreement with the Afghan government should include provisions for
release of any detainees taken into custody by U.S. or allied forces and held in preventive
detention at the conclusion of hostilities, regardless of whether they are held in
a U.S.- or Afghan-government-run facility.
219. Dep’t of Def. Roundtable, supra note 36.
220. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (confirming that the defendant’s position
could amount to authorizing perpetual detention, at least as to preventive detention—but
explicitly not in regard to interrogative detention according to the state of the law of war at the
time).

366

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:325

a detainee held in preventive detention is released unless the Detaining Power
can establish continued military necessity.
Effort should be made to examine existing laws of war for international
armed conflict in order to identify areas left unregulated by those laws or in
which they are an ill fit for non-international armed conflict. U.S. lawyers
should likewise use experience in the present conflict to reflect on the
limitations of habeas jurisprudence. The executive branch should disclose
information regarding the decisional criteria and procedures used by executive
branch bodies that initially select individuals for detention. This murky, poorly
understood, and nonpublicly regulated area should be public interest lawyers’
target for greater transparency and accountability.221
Finally, work should begin on international agreements to facilitate transfers
of detainees. The quadrennial review of the Geneva Conventions between
November 28 and December 1, 2011, focused in part on the issue of detainee
transfer. 222 The Copenhagen Process, an attempt to formulate rules and
procedures for detainee transfer initiated by the Government of Denmark, may
provide helpful ideas for U.S. efforts.223
C. Interrogative Detention
Interrogative detention poses a multitude of uncomfortable challenges. One
set of challenges lies in the mechanics and logistics of practice. Selecting
detainees for interrogative detention often occurs ad hoc in the field or under
exigent circumstances.224 Mass “sweeps” of civilians to hold for interrogation,
as conducted on some occasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, are an affront to the
international legal principles of distinction and proportionality. The principle
of distinction limits military attacks to military objects; it should be analogized
to inform military activities beyond attacks such as interrogative detention.
The principle of proportionality prohibits military actions that might produce
excessive civilian losses in relation to the military advantages gained. 225
221. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
222. As this Article goes to press, official notices documenting resolutions and decisions
resulting from the Quadrennial Review have yet to be issued. For agenda items, advance reports,
and resolutions prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent for
the Review, see Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Strengthening Legal Protection for
Victims of Armed Conflicts Draft Resolution and Report, 31IC/11/5.1.1 (Oct. 2011).
223. See, e.g., The Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, Non-Paper on
Legal Framework and Aspects of Detention, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007). For a
report on other countries’ experience, see generally Human Rights Inst., Columbia Law Sch.,
U.S. Monitoring of Detainee Transfers in Afghanistan: International Standards and Lessons from
the UK & Canada (2010), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights
_Institute/AfghanBriefingPaper%20FINAL.pdf.
224. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, FIELD
MANUAL NO. 2-22.3, at 6-3 to 6-6 (2006) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL NO. 2-22.3].
225. For discussion of these two principles and the United States’ commitment to them, see
Koh, supra note 33.
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Poorly discriminating sweeps that subject civilians to unnecessary detention
and violate human dignity would, by analogy, offend the principle of
proportionality. For the Detaining Power, moreover, too many sources of less
relevant information flood the mosaic and distort the composition; this harms
intelligence and military efforts. The United States needs to examine
systematically its recent experiences with mass detention and re-evaluate
intelligence gained against costs to counter-terrorism and other foreign policy
goals. International law experts might reconsider their conceptualization of
violence, to allow that violence can be perpetuated through detention as well as
attack. That would raise practical questions, such as whether regulations
concerning inducting people into detention should be more precisely drawn, to
incorporate the principles of distinction and proportionality.
Rules for interrogation itself need to incorporate standards of conduct, with
consequences for violation. The Obama administration took an important step
in directing that no detainees be held in CIA facilities, eliminating the
possibility of legally sanctioned “Black Sites,” closing any
pre-existing CIA facilities,226 and ensuring that any person detained under the
aegis of the ongoing conflict is held in a military-run facility open to Red
Cross inspection227 or, if criminally convicted, in prison. This is merely a start.
More is needed.
Criminal procedure in the United States relies on the “exclusionary rule” to
prevent misgotten evidence from aiding the prosecution at trial, thereby
harnessing institutional incentives to prevent abuse by police and
investigators.228 Similarly, the United States needs to ensure that institutional
incentives are aligned properly to ensure humane and lawful treatment of those
in interrogative detention during war. For example, a bright-line rule could
guarantee that no information gained from detainee mistreatment may be used
as actionable intelligence for operations or used in intelligence estimates.
Criminal liability could attach for any supervisor or implementer who violates
standards of detainee treatment or any policymaker who formulates policies on
the basis of information gained from torture. Best practices for non-coercive
interrogation should be promulgated; procedures of U.S. domestic
investigatory agencies like the FBI, developed under the discipline of

226. Exec. Order No. 13,491, § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 199, 201 (2009) (“The CIA shall close as
expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and shall not operate
any such detention facility in the future.”).
227. Id. § 4(b) (“All departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall provide the
International Committee of the Red Cross with notification of, and timely access to,
any individual detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the effective control of an
officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility
owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States Government,
consistent with Department of Defense regulations and policies.”).
228. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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exclusionary rule jurisprudence, provide a useful starting point.229 The U.S.
military, both in the standards that it sets for treatment of detainees during
questioning and in the discipline it imposes on its personnel to obey guidelines,
provides a threshold to which the intelligence agencies should be held at
law.230
Finally, procedures used to review the continued detention of those held for
questioning are overdue for re-examination. The underlying principle of the
laws of war—to set conditions for ending hostilities as humanely and quickly
as possible—should inform legal standards for state practice. The standard for
interrogative detention should be imminent tactical military utility rather than
possible contribution of bits for a future intelligence synthesis. Although the
mosaic may be a useful hermeneutic for intelligence work, it is not worth
undermining a commitment to detaining as few people as possible, justified
only by immediate military operation. The United States needs to establish
continuous procedures to ascertain if the information a given detainee may
have remains timely or justifies continued detention.
As a broader matter, rights advocates would be well advised to acknowledge
some conclusions gained by empircal observations of state practice.
Interrogative detention has become a widespread practice in the national
security context. Criminal procedure is irrelevant outside of criminal detention
and seeking its protections will not help detainees held in interrogative
detention. Rights advocates would thus be better advised to engage military
and intelligence counterparts in serious dialogue to formulate detainee
safeguards that will work.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the Hamdi majority in a case that
set some of the conceptual parameters for detention in the “war on terror,”
reminded the executive branch “that a state of war is not a blank check” for the
exercise of executive power.231 It is time for a reality check about the variety
of practices conducted under the broad heading of detention in the “war on
terror.” Over the past decade, detention assumed an unprecedented importance
in modern U.S. war-fighting doctrine. The challenges of conflict against a
non-state actor outstripped specifications in the law of war regarding
non-international armed conflict. In areas where the law was silent or
compliance poorly monitored, some gravely infelicitous experiments with
detention ensued. Categories of detainees and protections blurred. The U.S.
229. Carl A. Benoit, Confessions and the Constitution: The Remedy for Violating
Constitutional Safeguards, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/stats
-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/april-2010/confessions-and-the-constitution (last
visited Jan. 1, 2013).
230. See, e.g., FIELD MANUAL NO. 2-22.3, supra note 224.
231. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“[A] state of war is not a blank check for
the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”).
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legal community concentrated on the procedures that govern criminal detention
and the formal trials that bring it to an end, while the U.S. executive branch
mostly practiced detention for other reasons in the “war on terror,” most
prominently preventive detention and interrogative detention. The principles,
law, and procedures regulating preventive and interrogative detention are
overdue for the level of scrutiny that military commissions have garnered.
Under the Obama administration, the U.S government initiated a review of
its detention procedures. 232 The Administration should publicly release the
review’s findings, allowing public scrutiny and further evaluation of detention
as practiced in the ongoing conflict. One goal of broad scrutiny is shared with
other Articles in this series: to refine the law and standards that guide
detentions practice so that, in future conflicts, a states’ practice in dealing with
a non-state actor may advance the fundamental purpose of the law of war,
namely, to end hostilities as quickly and humanely as possible.

232. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 3 C.F.R. 207 (2009).
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